



Civil Aviation Safety Authority  
of Papua New Guinea

# Advisory Circular

## AC108-1

### Air Operator Security Programme

Revision 2

06 May 2025

#### General

Civil Aviation Authority Advisory Circulars contain information about standards, practices, and procedures that the Director has found to be an Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) with the associated rule.

An AMC is not intended to be the only means of compliance with a rule, and consideration will be given to other methods of compliance that may be presented to the Director. When new standards, practices, or procedures are found to be acceptable they will be added to the appropriate Advisory Circular. Conformance with this AMC will ensure acceptance of the entity's security programme.

#### Purpose

This Advisory Circular provides guidance for compliance with the security requirements and standards of Civil Aviation Rule Part 108 – Air Operator Security Programme. It supports air operators in the development and implementation of effective security programmes, including measures to address insider threats, the carriage of firearms on board aircraft, security controls for cargo and hold baggage, and the screening of personnel through background checks. This revision also introduces guidance on managing disruptive persons, security control of transfer cargo and mail, and requirements for initial and recurrent security awareness training aligned with applicable performance standards.

#### Related Rules

This Advisory Circular relates specifically to Civil Aviation Rule Part 108 and the establishment of an air operator security programme required by:

- (a) an airline air operator certificated in accordance with Part 119
- (b) a foreign air transport operator certificated in accordance with Part 129

#### Change Notice

This Advisory Circular (AC108-1) is Revision 2. It reflects updates made to align with the amendments to Civil Aviation Rule Part 108 effective 21 March 2025. This revision supports the implementation of updated regulatory requirements by providing expanded and clarified guidance to air operators on developing and maintaining their security programmes.

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## Definitions

See also *Civil Aviation Rules, Part 1 Definitions and Abbreviations* for other terms.

General definitions can be found in CAR Part 1, Definitions, Abbreviations, and the Civil Aviation Act 2000. The following definitions for terms used in this Advisory Circular either originate from that Act or in relevant cases, reflect the general usage by industry and have been listed for the purposes of ensuring a common understanding.

**Accompanied baggage** means hold baggage, which travels in the same aircraft as the passenger, or crew member that checked it in.

**Appointed person** means a person appointed by an aircraft operator or by the operator's agent as responsible for hold baggage authorisation for a particular flight.

**Authorised baggage** means baggage where the requirements of hold baggage authorisation have been met.

**Baggage** means personal property of passengers or crew carried on an aircraft by agreement with the operator, or personal property of passengers or crew that is intended by passengers or crew to be carried on an aircraft.

**Baggage container** means a receptacle in which baggage is loaded for conveyance in an aircraft.

**Baggage sorting area** means that area in which departure baggage is sorted into flight loads.

**Cargo** means any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and baggage

**Carry-on baggage** means baggage and any other item that—

- (a) is carried on to an aircraft by a passenger or crew member with the agreement of the operator; and
- (b) remains in the custody of the passenger or crew member.

**Cleared Bag** means an item of checked baggage that has been cleared for travel at any level of screening.

**Crew baggage** means hold baggage belonging to the crew of an aircraft.

**Declaration of Security** means a declaration of security issued by a regulated air cargo agent in accordance with Part 109.

**Dedicated transfer baggage container** means a baggage container in which transfer baggage destined for the same airport is loaded.

**Domestic air operator** means an air operator who conducts commercial air transport operations within Papua New Guinea.

**Enhanced Security Controls and Enhanced Security Control Measures** means any one or more of the following measures:

- (a) searched by hand;
- (b) screened using conventional X-ray equipment from at least two different angles in succession by the same X-ray operator;
- (c) screened using a non-certified explosives detection system operated in the indicative mode,
- (d) i.e. where the X-ray image is presented to the X-ray operator for assessment and decision;
- (e) screened using a certified explosives detection system operated in either the automatic or indicative mode;
- (f) subjected to decompression in a simulation chamber and subsequently held securely for the remaining period of the estimated flight time prior to it being loaded; or
- (g) any other measure approved by the Director as an enhanced security control measure.

**Expedite baggage** means mishandled baggage, which the airline operator has confirmed, traced and located the owner of, and which is being forwarded to be reunited with its owner.

**Gate baggage** means baggage taken from passengers at the boarding gate or aircraft side for placing in the hold of the aircraft, which have not been added to the main hold baggage manifest.

**Hold baggage** means baggage placed in the hold of the aircraft.

**Hold baggage manifest** means a record of all hold baggage carried on an aircraft, which may include sub-lists of expedite baggage, crew baggage, transfer baggage and gate baggage and which may be electronic or manual or a combination of both.

**International air operator** means an air operator who conducts commercial air transport operations to or from Papua New Guinea.

**Known Customer** means a shipper of cargo or mail who has an established association with a regulated air cargo agent or an air operator for the carriage of the shipper's cargo or mail by air and who is registered with the regulated air cargo agent or the air operator.

**Mishandled baggage** means baggage involuntarily or inadvertently separated from the passenger or crew.

**Operational area** means—

- (a) the movement area at an aerodrome and its associated strips and safety areas; and
- (b) any ground installation or facility provided at an aerodrome for the safety of aircraft operations; and includes
- (c) any other area at an aerodrome that is designated by signs as an operational area

**Regulated Air Cargo Agent** means the holder of a regulated air cargo agent certificate issue in accordance with Part 109.

Security area has the same meaning as in Section 3 of the Act:

**Security certificate** means a certificate completed by the person who carried out the enhanced security control on an expedite bag certifying that the expedite bag has been subject to enhanced security controls and may be carried on an aircraft.

**Security control** means a method used to prevent the introduction on board an aircraft or at an aerodrome of a weapon, explosive or other dangerous device, article or substance that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.

**Suspect Bag** means an item of checked baggage that has been subjected to one or more levels of screening and indicates the presence of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) qualities and requires further investigation.

**Suspicious Bag** A bag that continues to indicate the presence of IED and cannot be cleared after the application of hold baggage screening processes.

**Transfer baggage** means baggage that is transferred directly from one aircraft to another aircraft.

**Transit baggage** means baggage that—

- (a) is on board an aircraft that arrives at an aerodrome; and
- (b) is still on board that aircraft when that aircraft leaves the aerodrome.

**Unauthorised baggage** means baggage that has not met the requirements of hold baggage authorisation.

**Uncleared Bag** means an item of checked baggage that until subjected to further screening measures cannot be cleared for carriage on an aircraft.

## Subpart A – General

### Rule 108.1 Purpose

This part prescribes rules governing the air operator security programme required by Part 119 and Part 129.

A commercial air transport operator certificated in accordance with Part 119 to conduct a regular air transport operation with an aircraft that has a passenger seating configuration (excluding any required crew seat) of more than 9 seats, and a foreign air transport operator certificate in accordance with Part 129 to conduct a foreign air transport operation carrying 10 or more fare paying passengers must establish an air operator security programme that meets the requirements of Part 108. The air operator security programme required for a Part 119 air operator certificate holder and a Part 129 foreign air operator certificate must be included in the certificate holder's exposition and the security programme cannot be amended without the prior acceptance of the Director.

### Rule 108.3 Definition

In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires—

**Domestic air operator** means an air operator who conducts commercial air transport operations within Papua New Guinea.

**International air operator** means an air operator who conducts commercial air transport operations to or from Papua New Guinea.

## Subpart B – Air Operator Security Programme Requirements

### Rule 108.51 Air operator security programme requirements

This is the general introductory requirement leading into the specific regulatory requirements covering both domestic and international commercial air transport operations.

#### Rule 108.51(1) Contract arrangements

This rule requires the security programme to contain the contractual arrangements by which the air operator will ensure that any contractor or agent involved in the handling of the air operator's services will comply with the security programme of the air operator. The specific content of any standard clause in contracts with the contractor or agent will normally be sufficient. Such contractual arrangements with respect to code-share flights or other similar commercial arrangements need to be documented in the security programme to clarify responsibility and accountability.

#### Rule 108.51(2) Training

For this requirement to be satisfied, any training carried out under this Rule needs to be carried out by a CASAPNG certified security instructor who has demonstrated competency to the Chief Executive, or to a person nominated by the Chief Executive. The air operator may identify a person, or persons, by name or simply by position. However, if the latter approach is used, the procedure must identify the process by which the competency of the people will be established. A list of the names of people so approved will need to be held by the operator for checking and confirmation during monitoring processes.

#### Rules 108.51 (3) Details of Air Operator Security Programme

This rule requires the details of the procedures for detailing the air operator security programme regarding, domestic security requirements, international security requirements, clearance of aircraft flights, training of personnel and security incident notification and reporting.

details of the procedures required by rule—

- (1) 108.53 regarding domestic security requirements;
- (2) 108.55 regarding international security requirements;
- (3) 108.57 regarding the clearance of aircraft flights;
- (4) 108.59 regarding the training of personnel;
- (5) 108.61 regarding incident notification and reporting;

#### **Rule 108.51(4) Annual periodic verification of implementation of security measures**

This rule requires the air operator to detail procedures that ensures compliance of the implementation of security measures is periodically verified at intervals of not more than 12 months including the implementation of security measures outsourced to external service providers.

#### **Rule 108.53 Security requirements – domestic air operator**

This rule applies to all air operators operating a domestic regular air transport passenger service in accordance with Parts 121, or 125.

##### **Rule 108.53 (a) Domestic security procedures**

This rule requires each air operator security programme for a domestic air operator must have security procedures for flights within PNG to safeguard passengers, crew, ground personnel, aircraft, and facilities, against acts of unlawful interference.

##### **Rule 108.53(b)(1) Carriage of a firearm in the aircraft**

###### **Individuals travelling with weapons, other than in-Flight Security Officers**

Weapons, such as firearms, should be prohibited in an aircraft cabin, except for use by law enforcement officers and other authorized persons who may require access to a firearm in the performance of their duties. Air operator should establish a clear procedure and implementing instructions that should specify the procedures and requirements for the carriage of weapons and ammunition on board an aircraft.

Air operators should ensure that the carriage of weapons on board an aircraft by law enforcement officers or authorized persons acting in the performance of their duties requires special authorization in accordance with national laws. For this reason, Air Operators should liaise with an relevant state authority with the responsibility for reviewing and approving requests for the carriage of weapons in aircraft cabins.

Procedure should detail the requirements for individuals with legal and administrative authorization to travel with weapons carried in aircraft holds, such as hunters, other sports persons and private security guards. Weapons belonging to such passengers should never be accepted for carriage in the cabin. Except for States that specifically prohibit the carriage of armed escorts, States should consider a request by another State to allow its operators to carry armed escorts other than in-flight security officers on commercial passenger flights.

###### **Law enforcement officers**

The following security measures pertain to law enforcement officers or government agents involved in protecting government officials or escorting inadmissible passengers, deportees or persons in lawful custody.

Requests for authorization to carry weapons on board an aircraft should be made well in advance of the scheduled departure date to allow the approving entity sufficient time to review the request and communicate the information to those that should be informed, such as the local airport police.

Any request to carry weapons on board an aircraft should be submitted in writing, signed by a senior official of the aircraft operator making the request, and provide the armed officer's travel itinerary, as well as the following:

- (a) justification for requiring access to the weapon while in flight;
- (b) assurance that the armed officer is legally empowered to possess the weapon; and
- (c) assurance that the armed officer has been appropriately trained in the use of firearms.

Law enforcement officers granted approval to carry a firearm in the cabin of an aircraft should be provided with a written authorization that can be presented to the aircraft operator and any other entity responsible for security. Officers should identify themselves to aircraft operator staff, airport security personnel and the airport law enforcement authority by displaying credentials, such as a police identity card, which include the officer's name, function, photograph and permit for carrying a firearm.

Law enforcement officers tasked with or accompanying deportees or persons in lawful custody should not be authorized to carry loaded weapons in an aircraft cabin. However, the State concerned may authorize the carriage of unloaded weapons in a flight crew compartment safety locker under the supervision of the pilot-in-command. Law enforcement officers protecting high-level State officials may retain the ammunition, while the ammunition of officers accompanying deportees or persons in lawful custody should be transported in the aircraft hold.

If a law enforcement officer is not providing official escort duties, the pilot-in-command is entitled to refuse storage of a weapon in the flight crew compartment. In such situations, the weapon and ammunition should be handled in accordance with the provisions for authorized individuals, and transported in the aircraft hold.

If the pilot-in-command agrees to allow an authorized weapon to be stored in the flight crew compartment, the aircraft operator and/or security staff should ensure that the weapon is unloaded by its authorized holder, that is, the law enforcement officer, placed in a security container, and given to the pilot-in-command by the police authority or airport security staff.

Aircraft operators should implement procedures to ensure that armed officers, prior to boarding an aircraft, are fully briefed and aware of the rules and regulations pertaining to the carriage, risk and use of weapons on board an aircraft. Many aircraft operators accomplish this essential duty by requiring armed law enforcement officers to read and sign a document containing the pertinent instructions.

Aircraft operators should ensure that the pilot-in-command and all crew members are advised of the seat location of each armed officer on board the aircraft. If more than one armed officer is on board the aircraft, each armed officer should be notified of the seat location of the other. If the flight itinerary of an authorized armed officer involves transfer or transit at other airports, advance coordination should be initiated between the relevant authorities to ensure compliance with the national relevant laws involved. Aircraft operators should be responsible for ensuring that stored weapons and ammunition are safely returned to law enforcement officers in an appropriate location at the destination airport.

### **Authorized individuals other than law enforcement officers**

The carriage of weapons by individuals who possess firearm licences or permits, such as hunters and private security guards, should not be permitted in the cabin of an aircraft, and should be accepted for transport in the aircraft hold under the following conditions:

- (1) an authorized and duly qualified person, as specified by the appropriate authority, has determined that the firearm is unloaded and, if necessary, dismantled;
- (2) the firearm is stored inside a locked container that is placed in a tamper-proof stowage receptacle in the baggage compartment, and is inaccessible to unauthorized persons on the ground or during flight;

- (3) ammunition is transported separately from the firearm in a suitable container, is placed in the aircraft baggage compartment, and is inaccessible to unauthorized persons on the ground or during flight; and ammunition for personal firearms is carried as hold baggage acceptable to the Director.

Aircraft operators should establish a clear policy on who is responsible for ascertaining that a firearm is unloaded, whether the passenger, through a written declaration, airport security staff or local police. NCASP requires that weapons be dismantled and rendered unusable while being transported. In the event a written declaration is not sufficient, the firearm should be physically inspected in a location designated by the airport authority, to ensure it is unloaded and safe for transport.

Hold baggage containing firearms and ammunition should be protected from unauthorized access from the time it is accepted into the care of the aircraft operator until it is loaded onto the aircraft, in accordance with the State's legislation, appropriate authority and ASP.

In addition to the measures identified above, passengers who intend to travel with a personal firearm and ammunition should be required to:

- (1) identify themselves at check-in;
- (2) produce all pertinent documentation which may include a firearm licence or permit, export and import permit, and any other authorization from relevant national authorities; and
- (3) sign a written declaration that they are aware of and accept the conditions under which the firearm and ammunition are to be transported.

The transport of weapons and ammunition in hold baggage compartments that are accessible during flight may be authorized provided that the compartment's doors remain closed and monitored during the flight, and that weapons are packed separately from any ammunition. In addition, such baggage should be loaded first so that other baggage blocks access.

Aircraft operators should ensure that any military munitions, including their component parts, are carried in accordance with international and national regulations.

For compliance with this Rule, the air operator needs to document procedures for the carriage of a firearm in respect of flights within Papua New Guinea. The procedures will need to cover the following as required under Rule 91.9 relating to the carriage of a firearm including:

- (1) prohibition of carriage in the passenger cabin of an aircraft without the approval of the Director; and
- (2) identification of the responsible senior persons within the air operator's organisation who holds a delegation from the Chief Executive to give the operator's agreement for carriage of a firearm in the passenger cabin of an aircraft; and
- (3) a procedure for notification to the pilot in command of the aircraft of the number of people authorised to carry such weapons in the aircraft cabin and their seating position in the aircraft.

Approval for the carriage of firearms in the passenger cabin of an aircraft, on a regular air transport service, will only be granted where—

- (a) the carrier of the firearm is a duly authorised police, or other law enforcement officer; and
- (b) where such carriage is considered by the Director to be essential; and
- (c) the Commissioner of Police supports the request for the permission; and
- (d) the operator agrees to the carriage.

## **Control of firearms and weapons**

The carriage of firearms and weapons on board aircraft, as well as by persons in an airport must be authorised and lawful. Normally, such carriage will be restricted to those categories of persons who need to be armed for official duty purposes and are specially authorized by the government. The carriage of any firearms or weapons on board an aircraft as hold baggage and cargo will be declared and subjected to the notification to the aircraft operator and PIC as per the respective certificate holders acceptance and carriage process.

The carriage of firearm or weapons through the screening checkpoints must be carried by appropriate authorised persons.

- (a) The air operator must ensure that procedures required under paragraph (a) must detail the means by which the requirements of rule 91.9 are complied with regarding carriage of firearm on board an aircraft.
- (b) The air operator must ensure that procedures required under paragraph (a) must detail the means by which the requirements of rule 91.9 ensure that armed personnel, prior to boarding an aircraft, are fully briefed and aware of the rules and regulations pertaining to the carriage, risk and use of weapons on board an aircraft.
- (c) The air operator must ensure that procedures required under paragraph (a) must detail the means by which the requirements of rule 91.9 ensure that each armed person is notified of the seat allocation of the other armed person(s), if more than one armed officer is on board the aircraft
- (d) The air operator must ensure that procedures required under paragraph (a) must detail the means by which the requirements of rule 91.9 records related to such notification are maintained.

The carriage of weapons is allowed only when an authorized and duly qualified person has

determined that they are not loaded, if applicable, and then only stowed in a place in accessible to any person during flight time. The instructions and /or directive in regard to the carriage of weapons in an area of the aircraft shall include, but not necessarily be limited to the following:

- (a) the presentation by the passenger of written documentation authorizing the transportation of weapons;
- (b) the categories of persons who are trained, duly qualified and authorized to verify and confirm that weapons are unloaded;
- (c) ensuring that such checks are conducted in an appropriately equipped and secure locations;
- (d) ensuring that the persons handling weapons and transporting weapons and ammunition through the SRA to the aircraft are appropriately;
- (e) determination of areas that are acceptable for the storage of weapons on board aircraft, so as to ensure inaccessibility to any person during flight time;
- (f) procedures for transfer and transit stations to be advised and to ensure the integrity of such items; and
- (g) procedures to be implemented to return the weapons and/or ammunition to the passenger at the final destination.

### **Rule 108.53(b)(2) Contingency procedures for responding to threats**

This rule requires the documentation of contingency practices and procedures to be applied by management, aircraft crew, and ground personnel to minimise the danger to the air operator's passengers, crew, and ground personnel in the event of a hijacking, bomb threat, or any other act of unlawful interference to which these rules apply.

The following specific matters are to be included when formulating a contingency plan to deal with the

situations envisaged:

- (a) initial notification:
- (b) information to be notified:
- (c) action by the aircraft crew and ground personnel:
- (d) action by airline management:
- (e) co-ordination with other organisations:
- (f) public affairs.

An air operator is required to include contingency plans in their security programme dealing with bomb threats in accordance with, or compatible with, established bomb threat assessment policy.

### **Rule 108.53(b)(3) Security of unattended aircraft**

This rule requires the air operator to establish practices and procedures for the security of an unattended aircraft to prevent unlawful interference with such aircraft. The security practices and procedures need to be sufficient to prevent an unauthorised person gaining access to an aircraft that is on the ground and there is no member of the crew or the air operator's ground staff or agent present to control access to the aircraft (i.e. unattended aircraft). These security practices and procedures are aimed at preserving the security integrity of the aircraft before the aircraft is used on a regular air transport passenger service. The documented practices, procedures, and the responsibilities must be included in the air operator's security programme and be implemented at all times.

The security practices and procedures for an unattended aircraft need to include:

- (a) responsibility for security of an unattended aircraft while the aircraft—
  - (1) is in preparation for a particular service; and
  - (2) between services in a transit, or similar, situation; and
  - (3) parked over night or otherwise temporarily out of service:
- (b) the closing up of the aircraft, and where it is possible to do so, securing of the aircraft doors, emergency exits, and baggage and cargo doors:
- (c) the removal of access steps, air bridges and other aids to getting into or onto an aircraft and the securing of same against unauthorised use:
- (d) the illumination or other protection of aircraft parked outside overnight. Different measures will be appropriate at—
  - (1) aerodromes where there is full time night security surveillance provided; and
  - (2) aerodromes where there is no full time night security:
- (e) security of hangars where an aircraft is parked when not in service:
- (f) internal and external inspection of an aircraft by crew, or other authorised people, after the aircraft has been unattended, including appropriate measures to cover—
  - (1) normal situations; and
  - (2) circumstances where unauthorised access has, or is suspected of having, occurred; and
  - (3) circumstances where the aircraft is operating under higher than normal threat factor; and
  - (4) circumstances where the aircraft has been, or is suspected of having been, interfered with:

- (g) identification of people authorised to have access to aircraft, (ID Cards, passenger boarding documentation, direct escort by operator or handling agent staff, and crew), and the checking of these credentials by operator, crew, or handling agent staff.

#### **Rule 108.53(b)(4) Security Area or Security Enhanced area and Operational area access control**

This rule requires the air operator to establish practices and procedures for the positive control of access for security areas or security enhanced areas of security designated aerodromes and operational areas at Port Moresby International Airport (PMIA) and other aerodromes within PNG. These also includes access through any facility leased, owned, or used by the operator or its agents. These procedures also need to include other situations where access is provided exclusively for, or for the time being, being used for the access of the air operator's passengers, personnel, cargo, baggage, freight, or aircraft supplies. The operator is to include these in their air operator security programme;

- (a) procedures establishing and implementing identification systems in respect of persons and vehicles in order to prevent unauthorized access to airside areas and security restricted areas; and
- (b) procedures to ensure access must be granted only to those with operational need or other legitimate reason to be there
- (c) procedures to verify the identity and authorisation at designated checkpoints before access is allowed to airside areas and security restricted areas
- (d) procedures ensuring that persons other than passengers, together with items carried, are screened by the airport operator prior to entry into airport security restricted area

Without in any way reducing the responsibility of the operator to prevent unauthorised access, the air operator should include procedures for immediate steps to be taken to report to the appropriate authorities where—

- (a) it has not been possible to prevent the access of any unauthorised person through a facility as detailed in their air operator security programme; or
- (b) it is suspected that access control may have been breached for any reason.

The action detailed needs to be appropriate to reduce risk to aircraft operational security and safety, including the security searching of the aircraft where the circumstances suggest such action is appropriate.

*(Security area is defined in CAR Part 1 and Operational area is defined in this AC108).*

Within Papua New Guinea, where the access control is provided by the air operator, the aerodrome operator, or the Aviation Security Service, no further approval is required. However, where any other organisation desires to carry out this activity on behalf of others, either exclusively for an operator, or on behalf of two or more certificate holders, the organisation is required to be approved by the aerodrome certificate holder.

#### **Rule 108.53(b)(5) Protection of Cargo, catering, courier, and mail, aircraft supplies and stores and special category of cargo.**

This rule requires documentation of the procedures by which cargo, catering, courier parcels, and mail, aircraft supplies, stores, and air operator's supplies, transfer cargo and mail, COMAIL and COMAT, special category of Cargo (such as high value cargo, diplomatic bags, live animals, perishable good biomedical supplies and vaccines, other perishable medical items, life sustaining items, human remain and nuclear materials etc.) handled and carried on the operators aircraft are to be afforded appropriate security controls. The rule is outcome-based in which it establishes a requirement for appropriate security controls but does not specify what those controls are. Guidance and information is presented

below on standards, practices, and procedures that the Director has found to deliver a suitable level of security control in the current domestic security environment and that accordingly are appropriate and an acceptable means of compliance.

### **Cargo and Courier Parcels**

The air operator must establish procedures for cargo and courier parcels carried on air transport passenger operations that are subject to this Rule must be subject to security controls to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives, or any other dangerous devices that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference on both domestic and international cargo and mail.

It should be noted that CAR Part 109, Regulated Air Cargo Agent—Certification, applies only to cargo carried on international air passenger services. To protect shipments against the introduction of weapons, explosives, or any other dangerous devices that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference air operators may, without further security measures, accept cargo for shipment only from known customers. An air operator security programme needs to include the means by which the operator has accepted the shipper as a known customer and the means by which the identity of these known customers is made available to persons accepting the cargo for carriage. Where—

- (a) the identity of the shipper is not known; or
- (b) compliance with above known customer procedures cannot be proved; or
- (c) the delivery is made through a third party; or
- (d) the actions of the shipper arouse suspicion— the content of the items should be positively determined by manual or combined X-ray and manual, examination.

### **Mail**

The air operator must ensure that procedures are to be included, and implemented, that will prevent airmail and air parcel post that has not been received through normal postal channels from being loading aboard aircraft.

Procedures are to include the examination of seals and other security arrangements, developed in collaboration with postal authorities and other involved agencies, to ensure that shipments of mail have not been interfered with.

### **Cargo and Mail Acceptance and Transport**

#### **Acceptance**

The air operator should have procedures for the acceptance of cargo and mail to determine if the cargo and mail is from a:

- (a) Regulated Air Cargo Agent (RACA);
- (b) known customer; or
- (c) unknown customer.

A RACA is defined in Rule Part 1 as the holder of a regulated air cargo agent certificate granted under section 49 of the Civil Aviation Act 2024 and in accordance with Civil Aviation Rule Part 109.

A known customer is defined in Rule Part 1 as a shipper of cargo or mail who has an established association with a RACA or an air operator for the carriage of the shipper's cargo or mail by air and who is registered with the RACA or the air operator. This definition refers to the actual shipper or originator the goods for the consignment to be flown on an aircraft. This is the company or person who actually packs the cargo or mail and can verify that only the intended items are contained within the consignment. A known customer must be able to demonstrate to the air operator that they are the originator of the cargo they present for carriage. Appendix III provides additional guidance on establishing and maintaining the known customer relationship.

A known customer may also be a consolidator of various cargo shipments and can present multiple individual shipments under one consignment note or air waybill. This requires that the known customer has a business relationship with each of the shipper's cargo that is being presented and there is the known customer methodology applied from the originator of the goods.

If the consolidator receives cargo from an entity who is not a recognised known customer of the consolidator, then the consolidator must:

- (a) Have appropriately trained personnel inspect the cargo to confirm the contents of the package(s) are as described on the related shipping information and that it contains no prohibited items prior to being presented to the air operator or,
- (b) Declare the cargo as unknown to the Air Operator and the shipment must then be screened using the applicable security measures required.

An unknown customer is one where there is no established relationship with the air operator or RACA and no security controls have been applied to the cargo prior to acceptance by the air operator.

All cargo and mail presented for carriage by air should be checked by the person accepting the cargo and mail on behalf of the air operator to check whether it has originated from a RACA known customer or unknown customer.

In practice the air operator should:

- (a) Provide all staff accepting cargo and mail with access to the current list of RACAs from the CAA website.
- (b) Maintain a centralised and up to date list of the air operator's known customers that can be accessed by all staff accepting cargo and mail.

### **Acceptance – RACA**

The following prescribes the steps to achieve an acceptable means of compliance in relation to the acceptance of cargo or mail from a RACA:

- (a) Confirm the cargo or mail is from a certificated RACA.
- (b) Confirm the cargo or mail has been delivered by a person authorised under Civil Aviation Rule Part 109 to deliver that cargo or, where the cargo or mail has been delivered in a tamper evident manner visually check the cargo or mail to ensure it has not been tampered with. If there is any indication the cargo or mail has been tampered with the cargo should not be accepted or should be treated as unknown.
- (c) Confirm the cargo or mail has been accompanied by a security declaration.
- (d) Accept cargo for carriage and store in a secure area that prevents unauthorised access until it is loaded onto an aircraft for carriage, as referred to under the heading of Air Operator Facility Requirements below.

### **Acceptance - Known customer cargo**

The following describes the steps to achieve an acceptable means of compliance in relation to the acceptance of cargo or mail from a known customer.

- (a) Confirm the cargo or mail is from a known customer approved by the airline.
- (b) Confirm the cargo or mail has been delivered by a bone fide representative of the known customer.
- (c) Ask the customer or delivery agent of the goods for identification. Record the type of identification presented including any serial or issuing number on the declaration, e.g.

- passport, Avsec ID and/or drivers licence number.
- (d) Check the consignment note, or other document that describes the contents to ensure the cargo or mail contains no prohibited items, weapons or explosives.
  - (e) Check the cargo or mail matches the documented description.
  - (f) Visually check the cargo or mail to ensure it has not been tampered with. If there is any indication the cargo or mail has been tampered with, the cargo should either not be accepted or should be treated as unknown.
  - (g) If the cargo contains no prohibited items, weapons, explosives or dangerous goods and shows no sign that it has been tampered with, complete a cargo consignment note together with a security declaration.
  - (h) Accept cargo for carriage and store in a secure area that prevents unauthorised access until it is loaded onto an aircraft for carriage.

### **Acceptance - Unknown customer cargo**

The following describes conditions and steps to achieve an acceptable means of compliance in relation to the acceptance of cargo or mail from an unknown customer.

- (a) The cargo or mail is presented by the customer.
- (b) Cash payments (including cheques) should not be permitted and only an electronic form of payment, e.g. credit card, eftpos or wired transfer should be used.
- (c) Ask the customer for identification. Record the type of identification presented including any serial or issuing number, e.g. passport and drivers licence number on the declaration. The record of identification should be retained for at least 31 days.
- (d) The person accepting the item on behalf of the air operator must complete a visual inspection of the cargo or mail to check it matches the documented description in terms of size and weight
- (e) Ask customer to open consignment in presence of the air operator's personnel. If the customer refuses to open the consignment, do not accept it for carriage.
- (f) Customer opens consignment.
- (g) Conduct a physical inspection of the contents and if needed, ask the customer to remove the contents to ensure no prohibited items, weapons, explosives or dangerous goods are contained within the consignment; or, screen cargo by use of one or more of the following approved screening methods as per CAR Part 109 Appendix B- B.1 requirements:
  - (i) Conventional x-ray equipment
  - (ii) Advanced technology x-ray explosives detection system (AT-EDS);
  - (iii) ETD systems;
  - (iv) EDDs;
  - (v) Computed tomography;
  - (vi) Physical inspection; and/or
  - (vii) Any other screening technology or method acceptable to the Director.
- (h) Cargo is cleared when it has had security controls applied to it, that give no indication of the presence of any weapon, explosive, or other dangerous device, article or substance, that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.

- (i) Complete a cargo consignment note together with the security declaration information.
- (j) Complete Unknown Customer portion of the declaration.
- (k) Endorse the type of security measure applied as either technical (i.e. x-ray, ETD, EDD) or other means (including visual and physical).
- (l) Check the declaration before the customer departs for accuracy and completion.
- (m) Accept cargo for carriage and store in a secure area that prevents unauthorised access until it is loaded onto an aircraft for carriage.

### **Aircraft Supplies, Stores, and Air Operator's Supplies**

The air operator must establish appropriate security control procedures must be documented for aircraft supplies and stores.

These include any catering supplies provided to the air operator Air Operators need to have procedures to ensure that aircraft supplies are handled in a secure environment by a trusted or known supplier. The means of concluding that the supplier is trusted or known must be included in the security programme

Where the aircraft supplies or stores are obtained from an area that is not included within the secure aerodrome environment, procedures must be documented for ensuring that no weapons, explosives, or any other dangerous devices that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference can be placed within the supplies or stores.

### **Securing special categories of cargo and mail**

Air Operators must establish procedures for securing of special category cargo as some consignments, due to their special nature, may be difficult to screen effectively. Such consignments should normally be transported through a secure supply chain from the point of origin and kept secure until they are loaded onto an aircraft. Where this is not possible or the secure supply chain has been broken, alternative security procedures and measures may be applied in accordance with requirements detailed in the NCASP to ensure that a consignment can be carried on a commercial aircraft.

- (a) official diplomatic bags/pouches, in accordance with the requirements details in the NCASP with the provision of the Vienna Convention.
- (b) biomedical samples, vaccines and other perishable medical items (BIOM);
- (c) life-sustaining items such as blood, blood products, bone marrow and human organs (LFSM); and
- (d) radioactive materials packaged according to Doc 9284 and identified as such, or items that will endanger the life or health of screeners (NUCL).

In order to ensure that the above categories of cargo are secure for transport by air, prior to acceptance such cargo should be:

- (a) clearly declared on shipping documentation as such, and have undergone a verification process to ensure that the cargo matches the description on the documentation (e.g. air waybill);
- (b) physically checked on receipt for any signs of tampering;
- (c) subject to documentary checks and direct verification, such as by a telephone call to the consignor, in order to establish their bona fides; and
- (d) continually protected against unauthorized interference.

## **Air Operator Facility Requirements**

The air operator is required to provide a secure environment for receiving consignments of cargo and mail, applying security controls, storing consignments, and delivering the consignment to the aircraft to ensure that consignments are not tampered with and to prevent the introduction of any weapon, explosive, or any other dangerous devices that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.

The facilities must be arranged to ensure that an air operator's personnel are able to distinguish between a consignment from an unknown customer, and a consignment from a known customer or one which has had security controls applied to it.

The outcome sought is that cargo and mail is managed in a manner that will ensure its security within the air operator's facilities from the time of acceptance from a known customer, or having had security controls applied to it in the case of acceptance from an unknown customer, until delivery to the aircraft.

## **Screening of Cargo or Mail**

Any method of screening, including technical or other means, to be used by the air operator must meet standards acceptable to the Director. The Director will need to take into account the ability of any particular screening method to detect an aviation threat sized quantity of explosive. A range of factors may impact on what quantity of explosive could be considered to be a 'realistic aviation threat' in any particular instance.

The outcome sought is that cargo and mail is screened to a standard that will detect weapons, explosives, or any other dangerous devices that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.

## **Screening systems testing**

Air operators should have procedures in place to ensure screening methods are subject to periodic tests.

Where cargo is screened using one of the approved screening methods, that equipment should be tested at least once every 28 days to give ongoing assurance that the method is functioning as required and capable of delivering ongoing and appropriate levels of detection.

A test of the proficiency of the personnel who conduct screening methods should be conducted at least once every 150 days.

## **Transport of Cargo and Mail**

RACA – Civil Aviation Rule 109 requires a RACA to protect cargo or mail from any act of tampering from the time the consignment leaves the RACA's access controlled area until the time the consignment is accepted by the air operator.

Known Customer - Security controls applied to a known customer's cargo and mail, must be sufficient to prevent the placing of prohibited items, weapons or explosives in it during transportation to the air carrier.

This can be achieved by the cargo and mail being delivered to the air operator in a tamper evident manner where it would be clearly detectable should it be tampered with.

Vehicles carrying a known customer's cargo and mail should be attended. If the driver has to leave the vehicle for any reason, the vehicle must be secured. Persons delivering a known customer's cargo and mail to an air operator should provide positive identification and documentation provided by the known customer showing that the person is a bona fide employee or representative of that known customer.

Cargo and mail should be stored within an access-controlled area at the aerodrome, as referred to under the heading of Air Operator Facility Requirements above.

## **Domestic Transfer of Cargo and Mail**

Cargo or mail which does not leave the airport and is transferred directly from one domestic flight to another domestic flight (tail to tail) will not be subject to additional security controls in accordance with 108.53(b)(5), provided the appropriate security controls were applied at origin and the cargo is accompanied by a security declaration issued under Civil Aviation Rule Part 108 or Part 109.

### **Rule 108.53(b)(6) People obliged to travel – flight security**

This rule requires the air operator to establish practices and procedures sufficient to protect the safety and security of flights in situations where any person is to travel and an element of compulsion to travel is involved. This is to apply whether the passenger is travelling as a prisoner under escort, or is a person under any other judicial or official administrative proceeding. Rule 108.53 (c) also applies.

Any Papua New Guinea or foreign government agency must notify the air operator where it is proposed that any person who is subject to judicial or administrative procedures is to travel on a commercial passenger flight. The agency must inform the operator of the circumstances of the proposed travel. If the operator agrees to allow such travel to proceed, the operator may impose such conditions as it considers necessary for the safety of the flight, and must notify the pilot in command. The agency involved must comply with all such conditions imposed by the operator.

For compliance with rule 108.53(b)(6), the practices and procedures documented in the programme should address the following:

- (a) the procedures for considering each case and imposing conditions upon the travel that are sufficient to minimise the risk to the flight, other passengers, and crew, arising from the carriage of such people:
- (b) the procedures for declining to accept carriage of the person where the operator considers that the circumstances are such that safety cannot be reasonably assured:
- (c) where the travel involves the passenger transferring to a flight of another operator at any point of the journey, the procedures for ensuring, before the flight begins, that the other operators have been advised of the travel and have arranged conditions on that travel:
- (d) the following provisions are required only in respect of the carriage of people in custody in accordance with rule 108.53(c):
  - (1) people in custody must not be transported on board a regular passenger air service unless escorted by one or more escorting people:
  - (2) escorts must ensure that the person in custody does not carry any potentially dangerous items that could be used as a weapon:
  - (3) escorts are to be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event that restraint is necessary. Such restraint should not, under normal circumstances, include the prisoner being shackled to any part of the aircraft:
  - (4) escorts are to adequately identify themselves to security personnel and law enforcement officers on duty at the point of departure, where appropriate on board the aircraft, and at any transit or transfer stop during the journey:
  - (5) the air operator must ensure that the pilot in command and the senior cabin crew member on board are appraised of the fact that there is a prisoner, or are prisoners, and escorts on the flight, of the security precautions being taken, and of the seating arrangements:
  - (6) escorted people are to be emplaned before the other passengers, and deplaned after

all other passengers have left the aircraft:

- (7) people in custody, and their escorts, are to be seated as far to the rear of the aircraft as possible, but not immediately adjacent to any exit door:
- (8) where the aircraft seating configuration permits, people in custody are to be seated in a row of two or more seats and at least one escort should be seated between the person in custody and the aisle. In an aircraft where this is not possible, the escort is to be seated immediately opposite the person under escort:
- (9) people in custody should be accompanied at all times, including visits to the lavatory:
- (10) no intoxicating liquor may be served to either people in custody or escorts, but food may be served at the discretion of the escort. People in custody are not to be provided with metal utensils for eating:
- (11) in the case of people considered to be particularly dangerous by the escorting agency or on the evaluation of the air operator at least two escorts are to be provided. No more than one such person in custody and escorts are to be carried on any one flight:
- (12) in any circumstances, the air operator is to limit the number of people in custody carried on any one flight in accordance with rule 108.53(c)(9) to—
  - (i) one person in custody on aircraft with up to 29 passenger seats
  - (ii) one further person-in custody for each additional 25 seats (See Table 1 below)
- (e) the carriage of mentally disturbed people who in the opinion of the operator or the agency responsible for the person, are considered to be dangerous, may be accepted for transportation under the following conditions—
  - (1) they are accompanied by attendants physically capable of restraining such people if necessary; or
  - (2) the attendants are capable of administering medication as may be required; or
  - (3) where a mentally disturbed person requires sedation prior to departure, each portion of the flight should last no longer than the effective duration of the sedative administered.
- (f) deportees, and other people travelling under administrative procedures, are to be evaluated, for their propensity to endanger the safety or security of the flight. This evaluation is to be carried out by a responsible representative of the operator. Where the operator's representative considers that any risk to safety exists, the operator's security personnel or advisers should be consulted. Based upon such an evaluation, the operator may arrange for additional security measures, as are appropriate in the circumstances, sufficient to ensure the safety of other people on board and of the flight.

The Following table details the maximum number of persons in custody to be carried in accordance with rules 108.53(c)(9) and 108.55(c)(9)

**Table 1: Maximum number of persons in custody per aircraft seating capacity**

<b>Aircraft Certificated Seating Capacity</b>	<b>Maximum Number of Persons in Custody to be carried</b>
1-20	1
20-44	2

<b>Aircraft Certificated Seating Capacity</b>	<b>Maximum Number of Persons in Custody to be carried</b>
45-69	3
70-94	4
95-119	5
120-144	6
145-169	7
170-194	8
<b>195-219</b>	<b>9</b>

### **Rule 108.53(b)(7) Passenger and baggage reconciliation – passenger failing to board**

This requirement is in addition to any other security measures that may have been afforded a passenger's checked baggage. It requires the air operator to establish and include, in their air operator security programmes, practices and procedures to positively identify the reconciliation of baggage to be loaded on board. The reconciliation is to be between the baggage and the passengers to be carried. The purpose of this requirement is to confirm that all people who check in for a regular air transport operation, (whether as a joining, transit, or transfer passenger) board or re-board the aircraft. In every case where checked baggage has been accepted and the passenger, fails to board or re-board the aircraft the baggage must not be loaded, or if already loaded the risk is to be assessed by the operator and the pilot in command.

Based on the assessment of the risk, a decision is then to be made, by the pilot in command, whether the baggage should be transported on the aircraft or be removed from the aircraft before departure. Checked baggage of a person who has failed to board must not be reloaded onto a commercial air transport aircraft until it has been subjected to specific inspection by trained and competent security staff. In addition to any X-ray or other technical examination, the inspection should include detailed hand inspection.

As an exception to the above requirements, an air operator may include procedures for baggage to remain on board in circumstances where the passenger is unable to embark or re-board under the following circumstances that are clearly and verifiably beyond the control of the passenger—

- (a) in the event of the passenger's death after check-in and before the aircraft departure; or
- (b) if the passenger elects to off-load himself or herself at an alternative airport as a result of diversion to that airport by the operator due to operational factors alone, such as flight delays or flight cancellation for weather or mechanical reasons, or for operational conditions at the originally planned aerodrome of arrival; or
- (c) if the operator reroutes the baggage, or a passenger, because of weight, or similar operational requirements, that could not have been anticipated by the passenger at the time the baggage was checked in with the airline. This does not apply where the passenger volunteers to be offloaded or where the change is at the passengers' request.

Any such procedure needs to include a documented decision-making process that includes consultation with the pilot in command of the departing aircraft.

### **Rule 108.53(b)(8) Passenger screening contingency**

This rule requires the air operator to establish and include, in their respective air operator security programme, contingency practices and procedures for screening of passengers, crew members and the carry-on baggage of those passengers and crew members boarding a domestic regular air transport passenger service when such screening in accordance with rule 108.63 is required by the Director under sections 152 of the Civil Aviation Act 2000.

Rule 108.63 details the requirements for screening carried out in Papua New Guinea which must be conducted by the Aviation Security Service or the holder of an aviation security service certificate issued in accordance with Part 140.

The screening must be appropriate to prevent the introduction of unauthorised articles and dangerous items onto the aircraft. The screening must take place in an environment that prevents any person so screened from having contact with any person or item that has not been subject to security control. If any person, travelling on the aircraft and having been screened, comes in contact with people or objects that have not been subjected to security control, all people boarding or having boarded the aircraft for the departure must be re-screened. This requirement exists from the time the security screening is completed, for any individual, until the closing up of the aircraft for departure. Where any person refuses to be screened or fails to present their carry-on baggage for screening, the operator must not permit that person or their baggage to board the aircraft or to come into contact with any person who has been screened.

### **Rule 108.53(b)(9) Protection of Domestic hold baggage screening contingency plan**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures to ensure that all hold baggage must be screened in accordance with rule 108:

- (a) This rule requires the air operator to establish procedure to be protected from unauthorised interference, from the point it is screened or accepted into the care of the aircraft operator until departure of the aircraft on which it is to be carried.

### **Baggage**

An air operator security programme must include procedures to prevent unauthorised access to passenger hold baggage from the time of its acceptance by the air operator. Hold baggage must be maintained in a secure environment at all times while in the custody of the air operator.

- (a) This rule requires the air operator to establish procedure to include the actions to be taken in the event that the integrity of hold baggage has been jeopardised such as re-screening before being placed on board an aircraft.

This rule requires the air operator to establish and include, in their respective air operator security programme, contingency practices and procedures for screening baggage other than carry-on baggage belonging to passengers and crew members on a domestic regular air transport passenger service when, as a result of an increased level of security risk, such screening in accordance with rule 108.63 is required by the Director under section 152. Rule 108.63 details the requirements for screening carried out in Papua New Guinea which must be conducted by the Aviation Security Service or the holder of an aviation security service certificate issued in accordance with Part 140.

Where any person refuses to allow their hold baggage to be screened, the air operator must not allow that baggage to be carried on board the aircraft.

- (a) This rule requires the air operator to establish procedure to include procedure for all persons and baggage reconciliation. The screening must take place in an environment that prevents any bag so screened from having contact with any unauthorised or unscreened

person.

- (b) The air operator must include procedures and actions to be taken in an event that the integrity of the hold baggage has been jeopardised. These may include re screening before the hold baggage is placed on an aircraft.
- (c) The operator must ensure that hold baggage transported on an aircraft belongs to bona fide passengers or crew members. This measure and procedures for all person and baggage reconciliation, passenger and baggage reconciliation, passenger and baggage matching or passenger and baggage association.

Person and baggage reconciliation should be performed in addition to other security measures, such as screening, aimed at ensuring that hold baggage does not contain any explosives or explosive devices.

### **Rule 108.53(b)(10) Increased level of security risk**

This rule requires the air operator to establish and document practices and procedures for reacting to situations where the Director requires the air operator to apply additional security measures in circumstances where the Director is aware of an increased level of security risk. The operator will also need to document the procedures for the implementation of the specified measures for all flights from such aerodromes in their Contingency Plan as the Director may specify.

### **Rule 108.53(b)(11) Preventing unauthorised access to an aircraft flight deck.**

This rule requires the air operator to develop procedures and practices relevant to the aircraft type and configuration that will prevent unauthorised persons from gaining access to the aircraft flight deck. These procedures must be included in the security programme or be referenced in the security programme as to their location within other operational manuals required for certification purposes.

This requirement is not intended to make lockable and/or strengthened cockpit barriers a regulatory requirement but in cases where they are fitted, supporting procedures need to be developed and implemented to ensure that the maximum possible security benefit is delivered.

In aircraft fitted with cockpit doors and in instances where there is a need to provide access during flight, the procedures must include methods of ensuring that unauthorised access is not gained during any period a door is opened.

By way of guidance, in the case of a person wishing to exit the flight deck door, that person should consider the following, prior to opening the door:

- (a) verifying with the cabin crew that any adjacent lavatory is not occupied by a passenger;
- (b) determining the circumstances that exist outside the door, particularly on any high risk flight or when an unknown passenger is within easy access of the door; and
- (c) confirming that cabin crew are positioned to block passenger access to the door area when it is opened.

It is essential that doors only be opened for the minimum time required to quickly leave or enter the flight deck compartment.

In the case of aircraft not fitted with flight deck doors, procedures must provide for management of the access to the flight deck by all practicable means. This may include appropriate signage and advice to passengers or other procedural based measures that may be specific to the type of aircraft involved.

Regardless of whether or not an aircraft is fitted with a flight deck barrier, visits to a flight deck should be confined to persons authorised by the pilot-in-command and procedures must be established for this. Only persons authorised by the pilot-in-command should be permitted access. Documentation must outline the procedure for authorising a person to access the flight deck and the number of persons should be kept to a minimum.

**Rule 108.53 (b)(12) Measures relating to Cyber Attacks**

Refer to 108.53(b)(21) for the Guidance material.

**Rule 108.53 (b)(13) Relocation of bomb and suspicious object to least-risk bomb location.**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedure and actions to be taken to relocate a bomb or suspicious object to a least risk bomb location, specific to the aircraft type, following an in-flight search.

**Rule 108.53 (b)(14) Carry-on items left in the cabin**

This rule requires the air operation to establish procedures to ensure that carry-on items are removed from the aircraft or otherwise dealt with in an appropriate manner by passengers disembarking from a transit flight before the flight departs unless the passenger screening process of the flights originating airport is acceptable to the Director or the flight is making an unscheduled stop.

**Rule 108.53 (b)(15) Background Checks**

This rule requires the air operator to establish process for the requirements of background checks to be completed:

- (a) Persons implementing security controls, persons with unescorted access to security restricted areas, and persons with access to sensitive aviation security information prior to taking up these duties or accessing such areas or information. A background check must be done to confirm a person's identity and previous work experience, including criminal history when legally permissible, whenever appropriate, should be carried out as part of the assessment of the individual's suitability for unescorted access to airside and security restricted areas.
- (b) The recurrent background checks are applied to such persons on an interval of not more than two (2) years. Background checks should be updated on a regular basis to ensure that the individual still meets the required criteria. A good practice is to update a background check every time airport security identification permits need to be renewed
- (c) Persons found unsuitable by any background checks are immediately denied the ability to implement security controls, unescorted access to security restricted areas, and access to sensitive aviation security information.

A permit should not be issued if, during the performance of a background check, it is determined that the applicant was convicted of:

- (a) certain crimes, specifically possession or use of illicit drugs, trafficking in illicit drugs, trafficking in weapons or illegal possession of weapons, aggravated assault, extortion, acts endangering public safety including acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, sexually related offences or membership in a criminal organization.
- (b) in exceptional circumstances, the national appropriate authority may determine that the applicant has been fully rehabilitated and no longer constitutes a risk; and
- (c) other relevant offences such as burglary, dealing of stolen goods, embezzlement, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, without making restitution.

In addition, those aviation security personnel implementing security controls should undergo additional background checks to confirm that they are not associated with a terrorist organization. Generally, these duties involve controlling access to and searching security restricted areas and aircraft, issuing identification permits to persons or for vehicles, or managing any persons performing these functions.

- (a) Details of the disqualification criteria after completion of a background check must be documented.
- (b) All records of the disqualification must be maintained and securely stored.

### **Rule 108.53 (b)(16) Procedures dealing with unidentified baggage and suspicious objects**

Aircraft operators are required to establish procedures to deal with unidentified baggage and suspicious objects in accordance with a risk assessment.

The objective of hold baggage screening is to prevent prohibited items from entering security restricted areas and being placed on board an aircraft in hold baggage. All originating and transfer baggage should undergo screening. Transfer baggage may be exempted from screening if the State has established an arrangement with another State and each State is satisfied that passenger hold baggage is appropriately screened at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized interference up to the point of departure at the transfer airport. Such arrangements should be based on bilateral agreements, an MoU or one-stop security agreements.

Person and baggage reconciliation should be performed in addition to other security measures, such as screening, aimed at ensuring that hold baggage does not contain any suspicious objects or explosives or explosive devices.

All unidentified baggage should be treated as suspect and handled in accordance with local laws and/or the NCASP. No unidentified baggage should be transported by air unless a definite link can be established with a passenger who travelled and has made a missing baggage claim, and the baggage has been subjected to appropriate screening. Such screening should be defined by the appropriate authority and may include security controls designed to ensure that the baggage has not been tampered with and that no unauthorized access occurred from the time it was originally screened to the time it was recovered.

If a passenger fails to board a flight, or disembarks before departure, the passenger's baggage should be offloaded from the aircraft and either:

- (a) directed to another flight on which the passenger is scheduled to travel, thereby re-establishing its status as accompanied baggage; or
- (b) subjected to appropriate screening before carriage, provided the offloading was a consequence beyond the passenger's control.

If a passenger travels as intended, but his or her baggage fails to make the flight because of a major disruption to airport operations or an unplanned operational constraint, and becomes unaccompanied, the history of the baggage from the point of check-in, i.e. its provenance, may constitute an acceptable means of security control.

The screening of hold baggage may be carried out by manual searches, X-ray equipment or other detectors of explosives and dangerous substances, or by a combination of manual procedures and equipment. In the interest of facilitation, the amount of baggage to be manually searched may be minimized by using contemporary screening equipment in conjunction with appropriate procedures conducted by well-trained and skilled personnel.

All baggage should be screened or searched by means that are acceptable to the relevant regulatory body. It is recommended that security staff adopt a principle by which all baggage retains an uncleared status until positively cleared, that is, each item of baggage to be examined is treated as uncleared unless it can be determined that the baggage and its contents do not include prohibited items. If baggage screened by X-ray has not been cleared, it should be further examined in an attempt to resolve the cause of concern. Baggage should not be allowed to proceed for carriage until such concerns are resolved fully and effectively. If the status of an item of baggage remains ambiguous, the baggage should be treated as uncleared and subjected to further appropriate screening procedures. X-ray

operators should reject or subject to further screening any baggage about which they have any reservation or doubt.

### **Rule 108.53 (b)(17) Use of appropriate screening methods for detecting explosives and explosive devices**

The objective of screening of persons/ passengers/ carry-on baggage/ hold baggage is to prevent prohibited items from entering security restricted areas and being placed on board an aircraft in hold baggage. All originating and transfer baggage should undergo screening.

All passengers, together with items carried, prior to boarding an aircraft must be screened to ensure that they are not carrying prohibited items such as explosives and explosive devices on their persons, in carry-on baggage or in the hold baggage which could be used to carry out or facilitate an act of unlawful interference.

### **Rule 108.53 (b)(18) Preflight checks of all originating aircrafts**

Aircraft operators have a responsibility to the travelling public and their employees to conduct secure operations. This obligation includes the conduct of aircraft checks and searches, protection of aircraft, aircraft maintenance areas and other restricted areas, and security measures for transit operations, baggage, cargo, mail and catering.

Aircraft operators are required to conduct preflight checks of all originating aircrafts checks and aircraft searches of specific areas and accessible compartments of the interior and exterior of aircraft. Aircraft operators' on-board checklist provides details of aircraft search procedures, including searches for concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, and the appropriate course of action to be taken should a bomb or suspicious object be found.

### **Rule 108.53 (b)(19) Aircraft protection from unauthorized interference**

Aircraft are vulnerable to the introduction of prohibited items not only by passengers, but also, while parked or being prepared for service, by intruders and airport staff. The prevention of unauthorized access to an aircraft depends not only on the application of effective security measures for the area in immediate proximity of the aircraft, as well as the vicinity of the apron, but also on effective access control measures at the airport level.

Aircraft parked overnight should be parked in controlled and well-illuminated areas. Illumination fixtures, in addition to being connected to the airport's main power supply, should be connected to a secondary power supply. Alternatively, portable lighting should be readily available for use when the main power supply is disrupted.

To ensure aircraft remain protected from unauthorized interference, including when parked overnight, they should either be guarded, or be kept under observation using unpredictably-timed patrols carried out by airport or aircraft operator security staff or law enforcement officers. Patrols are particularly effective during low-level airport operations when only a small number of authorized people are working.

An aircraft subjected to an aircraft security check or aircraft security search must be protected from unauthorised interference, from the time the aircraft security check or aircraft security search has commenced, until the aircraft departs.

### **Rule 108.53 (b)(20) Aircraft protection against MANPADs**

Attacks on aircraft engaged in civil air transport by surface-to-air missiles, or man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), have been rare but are not unknown. Successful defence against such an attack is difficult but not impossible and depends on close cooperation and coordination between ground

forces, operators, flight crew and ATS.

Aircraft may be vulnerable to a stand-off attack if they use runways and taxiways that pass over public roads and additional physical security measures should be considered to reduce the risk of an attack being mounted from such areas.

Protection from stand-off attacks against aircraft, airport installations and facilities launched from outside an airport perimeter may be achieved through the surveillance of such areas, including patrols of the airport perimeter by suitably equipped and trained security officers, static surveillance from observation posts, or the use of a CCTV system or other detection devices. Special attention should be paid to areas providing cover from observation, such as parking areas, woodlots, residential areas, disused buildings and areas beneath approach and take off corridors.

The defensive measures and procedures against MANPADs will include: aircraft equipment; In-flight procedures, ATS procedures; and ground procedures.

### **Man-portable air defence systems**

Efforts to remove or at least minimize the threat posed to civil aviation by man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and other weapons require a comprehensive approach and responsible State policies. States should implement strict controls on the import, export, transfer, re-transfer and storage of MANPADS and associated technologies, as well as on related training activities, and limit the transfer of MANPADS production capabilities.

The principal civil aviation target for this type of attack is large passenger aircraft that are airborne, whether in take-off, mid-flight or landing mode. Perpetrators in a MANPADS attack are likely to be external to the airport environment, rather than passengers, crew or airport staff. International and regional cooperation can enhance efforts to implement effective and affordable countermeasures to the threat posed by MANPADS. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is an example of an agreement designed to restrict illicit sales and movements of weapons systems and promote intelligence-sharing and related enforcement actions. Through such international legal instruments, States should be able to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, the illicit sale and movement of small arms and light weapons across State borders.

**In addition, Air Operators should consider implementing the following measures to address the threat associated with MANPADS:**

- (a) airport vulnerability assessments (to identify high-risk launch areas);
- (b) patrolling and community awareness;
- (c) training of pilots to use in-flight countermeasures (if available); and
- (d) air traffic control measures.

### **Rule 108.53 (b)(21) Protection of critical information and Communication systems and Data**

This Rule relates to Rule 108.53(b)(12) regarding measures and procedures for Cyber Attacks.

The civil aviation operation environment is changing rapidly and significantly with an increasing use of data and the deployment of new and interconnected technologies and communication systems, shifting from manual processes to more efficient automated processes, communications and storage, in order to enhance security and facilitation. The aviation sector is therefore increasingly reliant on the availability of information, communications and control systems, as well as on the integrity and confidentiality of data. Each certificate holder/ stakeholder in the aviation system should therefore identify its critical aviation information systems and implement protective measures using a risk assessment methodology, followed by the essential measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and, when

necessary, to respond appropriately to an incident.

Attacks on critical information and communication infrastructures have the potential to create substantial damage and disruption to services and also result in the potential compromise of information relating to sensitive security measures. Therefore, in line with Annex 17 Aviation Security, Standard 4.9.1 Measures relating Cyber threats, all certificate holders and stakeholders must establish the criteria for the protection of critical information and communications technology systems and data used for civil aviation purposes from unlawful interference:

**(1) Identification & Classification**

- (a) Inventory of Critical Assets  
Identify and maintain an up-to-date inventory of ICT systems and data critical to aviation safety, security, and operations.
- (b) Classification by Criticality  
Classify assets based on operational impact (e.g., safety-critical, security-critical, facilitation-critical).

**(2) Risk Assessment**

- (a) Holistic Threat Modelling  
Conduct structured risk-based threat assessments to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities in accordance to ASRAM Document.
- (b) Risk Register
  - (i) Maintain a centralized register of risks and associated mitigation measures.

**(3) Protective Measures**

- (a) Administrative Controls
  - (i) Policies, Procedures, and security awareness training
  - (ii) Defined roles, responsibilities, and segregation of duties
  - (iii) Personnel vetting and background checks
- (b) Technical Controls
  - (i) Firewalls, IDS/IPS, and endpoint protection
  - (ii) Network segmentation for safety and security domains
  - (iii) Data encryption (in transit and at rest)
  - (iv) Multi-factor authentication and strict access controls
- (c) c. Physical Controls
  - (i) Secure data centres and server rooms with limited access
  - (ii) Surveillance and intrusion detection systems
  - (iii) Access logs and physical entry controls

**(4) Continuous Monitoring**

- (i) -Implement Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM)
- (ii) -Use Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems
- (iii) -Perform routine log analysis, vulnerability scans, and system audits

**(5) Incident Detection & Response**

- (i) -Real-time monitoring and alerting of anomalies
- (ii) -Clear incident response plan with severity classification
- (iii) -Crisis communication plan and notification protocols

- (iv) -Post-incident review and lessons learned

**(6) Supply Chain Security**

- (i) Vet suppliers for cybersecurity practices
- (ii) Include security clauses in contracts and SLAs
- (iii) Monitor third-party compliance and system updates

**(7) Training & Awareness**

- (i) Regular cybersecurity training for all aviation stakeholders
- (ii) Specialized training for ICT personnel and incident responders
- (iii) Simulation exercises (e.g., Tabletop Exercises)

**(8) Post Event Analysis**

- (i) Once an incident response has been concluded and aviation operations restored to a normal operating mode, conducting a thorough analysis of the event is a critical step in ensuring that there is no future recurrence.
- (ii) Analysis should be performed with third party system providers, manufacturers or appropriate authority to help identify the root causes and identify cross-references to existing safety analyses/documentation.
- (iii) All findings and final recommendations should be shared with states and the aviation industry stakeholders so that they may adjust their respective cybersecurity governance approach and programme.

**Rule 108.53 (c) Procedures for carriage of potentially disruptive persons**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures as required by rule 108.53 (b)(6) shall include procedures to ensure, in relation to carriage of any potentially disruptive persons, or those that have been subjected to judicial or administrative proceeding on a commercial air transport operation.

Persons under arrest, as well as persons in lawful custody, inadmissible persons, deportees and persons suffering from mental illness, constitute passengers who have been subjected to judicial or administrative proceedings. They also form a subset of what is commonly referred to as special category passengers. Passengers who have undergone judicial or administrative proceedings may be considered a security risk and are subject to additional administrative proceedings prior to boarding an aircraft. In some cases, certain procedures, such as the requirement for an escort who may be armed, will apply throughout the duration of the flight and on arrival at the destination.

Certain preventive and security measures must be in effect before and during a flight with inadmissible passengers, deportees or persons in lawful custody on board.

**Rule 108.53 (c) (1) Person is escorted**

This rule required the air operator establish to establish procedures for escort. If the person is escorted a sufficient number of escorts should be deployed, based on a risk assessment and the nature and number of potentially disruptive passengers. The number of escorts required for each situation should be determined jointly by the relevant authorities and the aircraft operator.

Many inadmissible persons, deportees and persons in lawful custody travel voluntarily and peacefully, but on occasion such persons may present a security risk. It is common practice for aircraft operators to transport persons in lawful custody under certain conditions, i.e. if the person in custody is:

- a) not considered dangerous, he or she should be escorted by at least one law enforcement officer; or
- b) considered dangerous, he or she should be escorted by two or more law enforcement officers.

Notwithstanding the presence of escorts, not more than one such person should be allowed on any flight.

#### **Rule 108.53 (c)(2) Security screening of the person**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures to ensure that a search is conducted to confirm that the person is not carrying any item that may be used as a weapon. Additional security searches should be conducted on passengers and cabin baggage.

#### **Rule 108.53 (c)(3) Restraining Device**

This rule requires the air operators to establish procedures to ensure that the escort is equipped with adequate devices for restraining the person. Depending on the risk assessment, restraining devices should be available for use by escorts. The use of restraining devices by an escort should be limited to actual need and should conform to NCASP and the applicable aircraft operator policy

#### **Rule 108.53 (c)(4) Notification to Pilot in command**

This rule requires the air operator to established notification procedures to the crew, the pilot in command and the senior flight attendant, if carried, are notified of the location and the security arrangements of the person. Inadmissible persons, deportees or persons in custody should be boarded prior to other passengers, and the pilot-in-command should be informed of the seating location of such passengers and escorts.

#### **Rule 108.53 (c)(5) Serving of alcohol beverages**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures that alcoholic beverages are not served to the potentially disruptive person and their escort.

#### **Rule 108.53 (c) (6) Metal utensils**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures that specify that metal utensils are not provided for the persons use. Food and non-alcoholic beverages may be served at the discretion of escorts, but should not be accompanied by metal utensils or knives.

#### **Rule 108.53 (c )(7) Seating arrangements**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures for seating arrangements that the person is not seated in a seat or seat row next to the emergency exist.

Seats should be assigned as far as possible to the rear of the cabin, but not adjacent to a door or emergency exit, and should be in a row of two or more seats with at least one escort sitting between a potentially disruptive passenger and the aisle. To the extent practicable, escorted passengers should not be seated next to a minor;

#### **Rule 108.53 (c)(8) Appropriate seating**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures that the person is seated appropriately to ensure that the safe conduct of the flight is achieved.

#### **Rule 108.53 (c)(9) Number of persons permitted**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures that no more than one person is carried on an aircraft with a certified seating capacity of less than 20 seats and no more additional person in custody is carried for every additional 25 seats of certificated seating capacity.

#### **Rule 108.53 (c )(10) Risk assessment**

This rule required the air operator to establish procedures for a risk assessment to be completed and

any other pertinent information provided, including the reason for assigning or not assigning an escort. The number of potentially disruptive passengers should be limited according to a risk assessment, the reason for removal of the individual from PNG, and aircraft size. Refer to Table 1 in this AC.

### **Rule 108.53 (c)(11) Notification to air operator**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures of notification that it is provided at least 24 hours written notice to the airline operator before the intended departure of a of a potentially disruptive person or those who have been subjected to judicial or administrative proceedings.

The relevant authorities should, in addition to notifying the aircraft operator of a person in lawful custody who is to be transported by air, proceed to make travel arrangements only after obtaining the aircraft operator's agreement to carry the potentially disruptive passenger.

### **Rule 108.53 (c)(12) Notification to inbound aircraft operator**

This rule requires the air operator to establish notification procedures to notify the inbound aircraft operator without delay on the same day as the passengers arrival of the need to transport a potentially disrupted person, or those who have been subjected to judicial or administrative proceedings.

Before boarding a potentially disruptive passenger, the authorities should verify with their counterparts at transit points and the final destination that the travel conditions are acceptable to them.

The flight itinerary should be kept classified and should not be disclosed to the public.

### **The 108.53 (c)(13) Aircraft operator/ pilot in command's right to deny carriage**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures regarding the air operators or pilot in command's have the right to deny carriage based on the air operator's policy concerning the number of such persons that may be transported on a given flight, or when reasonable concerns exist in regard to the safety and security of the flight in question.

### **Rule 108.55 Security requirements – International**

This rule applies to all air operators certificated in accordance with Part 119 who conduct international regular air transport passenger services using aircraft with a passenger seating configuration of more than 9 seats. It also applies to all foreign air operators certificated in accordance with Part 129 who conduct a foreign air transport operation carrying 10 or more fare paying passengers.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(1) Carriage of a firearm in the aircraft**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures for the carriage of a firearm in the passenger cabin of an aircraft on a regular air transport operation.

For compliance with this Rule, the air operator must document procedures for the carriage of a firearm in respect of flights from, or within, Papua New Guinea or that will be arriving at any Papua New Guinea aerodrome from any overseas aerodrome.

The procedures will need to cover the following as required under rule 91.9 relating to the carriage of a firearm including:

- (a) prohibition of carriage in the passenger cabin of an aircraft without the permission of the
- (b) Director; and
- (c) identification of the responsible senior person within the air operator's organisation who holds a delegation from the Chief Executive to give the operator's agreement for carriage of a firearm in the passenger cabin of an aircraft; and
- (d) a procedure for notification to the pilot in command of the aircraft of the number of people

authorised to carry such weapons in the aircraft cabin and their seating position in the aircraft.

Approval for the carriage of firearms in the passenger cabin of an aircraft, on a regular air transport service, will only be granted by the Director where—

- (a) the carrier of the firearm is a duly authorised police, or other law enforcement, officer; and
- (b) carriage is considered by the Director to be essential; and
- (c) the Commissioner of Police supports the request for the permission; and
- (d) the air operator agrees to the carriage.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(2) Contingency procedures for responding to threats**

This rule requires the documentation of contingency practices and procedures to be applied by management, aircraft crew, and ground personnel to minimise the danger to an air operator's passengers, crew, and ground personnel in the event of a hijacking, bomb threat, or any other threat of unlawful interference to which these rules apply.

The following specific matters should be included when formulating a contingency plan to deal with the situations envisaged:

- (a) initial notification:
- (b) information to be notified:
- (c) action by aircraft crew and ground personnel:
- (d) action by airline management:
- (e) co-ordination with other organisations:
- (f) public affairs.

An air operator is required to include contingency plans in their security programme dealing with bomb threats in accordance with, or compatible with, established bomb threat assessment policy.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(3) Least-risk bomb location**

This rule requires the air operation to establish procedures and actions to be taken to relocate the Improvised Explosive device (IED) or the suspicious object to the least-risk bomb location specific to the aircraft following an in-flight search.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(4) Security of unattended aircraft**

This rule requires the air operator to establish practices and procedures for the security of an unattended aircraft to prevent unlawful interference with such aircraft. The security practises and procedures need to be sufficient to prevent an unauthorised person gaining access to an aircraft that is on the ground and there are no members of the crew or the air operator's ground staff or agent present to control access to the aircraft (i.e. unattended aircraft). These security practices and procedures are aimed at preserving the security integrity of the aircraft before the aircraft is used on a regular air transport passenger operation. The documented practices, procedures, and the responsibilities must be included in the air operator's security programme and be implemented at all times.

The security practices and procedures for an unattended aircraft need to include—

- (a) responsibility for security of an unattended aircraft while the aircraft—
  - (1) is in preparation for a particular service; and
  - (2) between services in a transit, or similar, situation; and

- (3) parked over night or otherwise temporarily out of service:
- (b) the closing up of the aircraft, and where it is possible to do so, securing of the aircraft doors, emergency exits, and baggage and cargo doors:
- (c) the removal of access steps, air bridges and other aids to getting into or onto an aircraft and the securing of same against unauthorised use:
- (d) the illumination or other protection of aircraft parked outside overnight. Different measures will be appropriate at—
  - (1) aerodromes where there is full time night security surveillance provided; and
  - (2) aerodromes where there is no full time night security:
- (e) security of hangars where an aircraft is parked when not in service:
- (f) internal and external inspection of an aircraft by crew, or other authorised people, after the aircraft has been unattended, including appropriate measures to cover—
  - (1) normal situations; and
  - (2) circumstances where unauthorised access has, or is suspected of having, occurred; and (iii) circumstances where the aircraft is operating under higher than normal threat factor; and (iv) circumstances where the aircraft has been, or is suspected of having been, interfered with:
- (g) identification of people authorised to have access to aircraft, (ID Cards, passenger boarding documentation, direct escort by operator or handling agent staff, and crew), and the checking of these credentials by operator, crew, or handling agent staff.

#### **Rule 108.55(b)(5) Security area or Security Enhanced area of Security designated aerodromes and Operational area access control**

This rule requires the air operator to establish practices and procedures for the positive control of access for security areas or security enhanced areas of security designated aerodromes and operational areas of other aerodromes within PNG. These also includes access through any facility leased, owned or used by the operator or its agents. These procedures also need to include other situations where access is provided exclusively for, or for the time being, being used for the access of the air operator's passengers, personnel, cargo, baggage, freight, or aircraft supplies. The operator is to include these in their air operator security programme.

Without in any way reducing the responsibility of the operator to prevent unauthorised access, the air operator should include procedures for immediate steps to be taken to report to the appropriate authorities where—

- (a) it has not been possible to prevent the access of any unauthorised person through a facility as detailed in their air operator security programme; or
- (b) it is suspected that access control may have been breached for any reason.

The action detailed needs to be appropriate to reduce risk to aircraft operational security and safety, including the security searching of the aircraft where the circumstances suggest such action is appropriate.

*(Security area is defined in CAR Part 1, and Operational area is defined in this AC108).*

#### **Rule 108.55(b)(6) Temporary additional security measures requirements**

This rule requires the air operator to establish and document practices and procedures for reacting to situations where the Director requires the operator to apply additional security measures in circumstances where the Director finds or suspects an increased level of security risk.

An air operator certificated under Part 129 will need to document the procedures for the implementation of the specified measures for any service within, or from, Papua New Guinea. The operator will also need to document the procedures for the implementation of the specified measures for all flights from such aerodromes as the Director may specify.

**Rule 108.55(b)(7) Protection of Cargo, catering, courier parcels, express parcels, and mail, COMAIL and COMAT, transfer cargo or mail, special category of cargo.**

This rule requires procedures by which appropriate security controls are applied to cargo, catering, courier parcels, express parcels and mail, COMAIL and COMAT, transfer cargo and mail and special category of cargo. Cargo (such as high value cargo, diplomatic bags, live animals, perishable good biomedical supplies and vaccines, other perishable medical items, life sustaining items, human remain and nuclear materials etc.) handled and carried on the operators aircraft are to be afforded appropriate security controls.

**Cargo**

Security control requirements for these items are covered by rule 108.55(c) and further detail is provided under this heading.

The protection of cargo and mail being moved within any aerodrome, which includes cargo makeup areas is covered by rule 108.55(b)(10) and further detail is provided under this heading.

**Protection of secured cargo**

Cargo consignments should be protected from unauthorized interference from the point of screening or when other security controls are applied until the departure of the aircraft. Unauthorized interference is the situation that would arise when a person has access to secure cargo but are not authorized to do so, or have not been screened to a standard sufficient to detect any prohibited item, and are thus in a position to introduce a prohibited item into that cargo consignment.

Staff should be screened before accessing secure cargo. However, when screening is not possible due to local conditions, other methods should be introduced that afford a similar level of protection. These methods may include the following:

- (a) constant observation of cargo by security personnel (either physical or via closed-circuit television (CCTV));
- (b) intrusion detection alarm areas;
- (c) locked and caged areas;
- (d) elevated or automated storage areas;
- (e) sealed containers; and
- (f) pallets wrapped in tamper-evident material.

Contingency plans should include provisions for re-screening of cargo consignments should there be any doubt over the integrity of consignments or where access to the consignments has been compromised.

**Catering**

The air operator must establish procedures for checking and sealing of vehicles, catering carts and containers originating from outside security restricted areas.

Before closing a catering cart or container for dispatch to an aircraft, the cart or container, along with its contents should be checked by a trained person, to the extent permitted by local laws and hygiene standards, to ensure that it does not contain any prohibited items and has not been tampered with. Immediately on completion of a check, catering carts or containers should be secured or made tamper-evident by applying seals or installing locks immediately following the completion of loading.

The person designated to carry out a security check must note its completion on the delivery

documentation, the delivery note, vehicle dispatch documentation or aircraft operator catering order, and sign the documentation.

Immediately prior to loading, vehicle storage compartments must be visually checked by a trained person designated by the in-flight supplies provider, to ensure that no unauthorized persons or prohibited items are inside. Once loaded, vehicle compartments should be appropriately secured using a method and/or process approved by the Director and in accordance with the NCASP (e.g. continued human surveillance, padlocks and tamper evident seals).

The air operator must develop procedures to ensure that drivers (and vehicle crews) must not leave vehicles unattended. Should there be a need to do so, drivers, when returning to a vehicle, must verify the integrity of load compartments, seals and/or locks.

### **Sealing measures**

If seals are used to secure carts, vehicles or compartments within vehicles used for storing and transporting in-flight supplies intended for carriage on an aircraft, in-flight supplies providers should only use seals that are tamper-evident and numbered (including digital seals).

In order to prevent unauthorized access to or use of tamper-evident and numbered seals, proper stock control and auditing procedures should be implemented. Stocks of such seals must be considered sensitive aviation security information and be managed and handled accordingly.

Tamper-evident seals used to secure vehicles, catering carts and containers must be affixed by a trained and authorized person. The relevant seal numbers must be annotated on the vehicle dispatch documentation.

Tamper-evident seals on delivery vehicles must be checked against appropriate documentation, such as vehicle dispatch documentation, by the airport authority at the designated entrance to an airport security restricted area, by the aircraft operator on delivery at an aircraft, or/and at the acceptance point in the in-flight supplies providers facility when originating from a secure supply chain. If there is any discrepancy with the accompanying documentation that cannot be resolved, or any signs of unauthorized interference with the seals, the load must be regarded as unsecure and must not be taken into security restricted areas or loaded on board an aircraft.

If seals are used on delivery vehicles when delivering multiple loads for different locations within airport security restricted areas, they must be broken by the driver at the first delivery point or at the entrance to a security restricted area. For subsequent deliveries detailed for that load within security restricted areas, the vehicle need not be re-sealed, but the vehicle crew must ensure that the storage compartments remain secure and/or supervised at all times.

If any doubt arises regarding unauthorized access to or potential misuse of the seals or if the integrity of the seal stock is compromised, the in-flight supplies provider must proceed to remove all seals used on catering carts and vehicles intended for transport on an aircraft, and thoroughly search the catering carts and vehicles from which seals have been removed. Additionally, all seals from the suspected compromised stock must be removed from storage and destroyed, in order to prevent their reintroduction into the in-flight supplies provider security system.

### **Courier Parcels, Express Parcels and Mail**

#### **Mail acceptance by air operators**

The air operator must establish procedures for accepting mail from a designated postal operator, regulated agent or external service provider contracted by it, an air operator must:

- (a) ensure that consignments are identified as mail by the use of prescribed receptacles and labels;
- (b) ensure that consignments are accompanied by the relevant UPU (*Universal Postal Union Acts*)

standardized delivery bill, either in writing or in electronic form and that consignors provide a full description of consignment contents and that the mail tendered matches this information; and

- (c) as the case may be, review the consignment security declaration.

### **Mail screening**

Mail must be subjected to security controls in the same manner as cargo consignments.

Generally, for legal reasons, security controls and screening of mail may be performed by designated postal operators only. The following guidance, however, is provided in the event that a

designated postal operator requires an aircraft operator or a regulated agent to conduct mail screening.

Security controls applied to secure mail must be applied to a specified proportion of a consignment only as determined by the appropriate authority following a risk assessment. Mail to be screened should be selected at random or using a targeted approach.

Those involved in the movement of time-sensitive mail must not provide consignors with flight- booking details unless they are known consignors or regulated agents

### **Transfer cargo**

Transfer and transit cargo and mail

Transfer and transit cargo and mail arriving from outside of the state of Papua New Guinea for transfer or transit by air, onward carriage by air, which has not been subjected to continuous security controls from the point of departure or enroute, must be treated as unsecure cargo and subjected to appropriate security controls.

While the State/Port of origin remains responsible for the application of appropriate security controls on cargo and mail consignments, the air operator and the airport Operator must ensure that such controls were applied prior to loading the consignments on a commercial aircraft departing from Papua New Guinea.

The following principles must be followed when dealing with transfer cargo and mail within Papua New Guinea:

- a) cargo and mail must be made secure at the point of origin and protected from unauthorized interference;
- b) a security status must be issued for cargo and mail at the point of origin and clearly indicated in a consignment security declaration;
- c) the security status (in paper or electronic format) must accompany each consignment to enable the subsequent verification of the security status of that cargo and mail;
- d) the air operator at the point of origin must ensure the application of appropriate security controls to cargo and mail at the start of their journeys;
- e) the air operator at the point of transfer must satisfy itself that the security controls previously applied to the cargo and mail meet its NCASP requirements; and
- f) where the airline operator is not satisfied that the transfer cargo and mail are secure, appropriate security controls, which may include screening, must be applied in accordance with its NCASP requirements.

## **Special category of cargo**

### **Securing special categories of cargo and mail**

Some consignments, due to their special nature, may be difficult to screen effectively. Such consignments must normally be transported through a secure supply chain from the point of origin and kept secure until they are loaded onto an aircraft. Where this is not possible or the secure supply chain has been broken, alternative security procedures and measures may be applied in accordance with the air operators requirements to ensure that a consignment can be carried on a commercial aircraft. Such exemptions, and the use of alternative security measures, should be strictly limited and clearly defined in the PNG NCASP. This may include the following and be identified by their associated four-digit alphabetic codes<sup>3</sup>:

- (a) official diplomatic bags/pouches, maybe exempted from screening (DIPL);
- (b) biomedical samples, vaccines and other perishable medical items (BIOM);
- (c) life-sustaining items such as blood, blood products, bone marrow and human organs (LFSM); and
- (d) radioactive materials packaged according to CAR 92.53 and identified as such, or items that will endanger the life or health of screeners (NUCL).

In order to ensure that the above categories of cargo are secure for transport by air, prior to acceptance such cargo must be:

- (a) clearly declared on shipping documentation as such, and have undergone a verification process to ensure that the cargo matches the description on the documentation (e.g. air waybill);
- (b) physically checked on receipt for any signs of tampering;
- (c) subject to documentary checks and direct verification, such as by a telephone call to the consignor, in order to establish their bona fides; and
- (d) continually protected against unauthorized interference.

### **High value cargo**

The air operator must establish Security measures for handling and protecting high value cargo when stored in cargo terminals and during aircraft loading and unloading, as well as during ground transport.

### **Live animals**

The air operator must establish appropriate security controls in order to secure live animals transported as cargo should be performed as far as practicable. These may include a visual check.

All accompanying items, such as feedbags, cages and containers, must be subjected to security controls and effective and appropriate screening.

Prior to acceptance of a consignment of live animals, aircraft operators must ensure that the consignment matches the description on the air waybill.

### **Unaccompanied baggage carried as air cargo**

Unaccompanied baggage carried as cargo must be subjected to appropriate screening and security controls.

### **Dangerous goods**

Cargo consignments containing properly prepared and packaged dangerous goods should be appropriately identified as such and declared prior to their acceptance for transport in accordance with PNG CAR 92, Carriage of Dangerous Goods.

Such consignments must be subjected to the same security controls as any other consignment. However, it is important to consider the following:

- (a) X-ray equipment or other technical means of inspection may render some types of dangerous goods unstable and therefore cannot be utilized; and
- (b) some consignments containing dangerous goods are prohibited from being opened since this could:
  - (1) expose staff members to harmful or hazardous materials; and
  - (2) prevent the consignment from being sent, as the integrity of the packaging may no longer meet the packaging requirements contained in the CAR 92 and the ICAO Technical Instructions (Doc 9284).

### **Human remains**

The air Operator must establish procedures to follow a known or account consignor<sup>1</sup> process for the carriage of human remains by air.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(8) People compelled to travel – flight security**

This rule requires the air operator to establish practices and procedures sufficient to protect the safety and security of a flight in a situation where any passenger is to travel and an element of compulsion to travel is involved. This is to apply whether the passenger is travelling as a prisoner under escort, or is a person under any other judicial or official administrative procedure.

### **Rule 108.55(c).**

Any Papua New Guinea or foreign government agency to notify the air operator where it is proposed that any person who is subject to judicial or administrative procedures is to travel on a commercial passenger flight. The agency must inform the operator of the circumstances of the proposed travel. If the operator agrees to allow such travel to proceed, the operator may impose such conditions as it considers necessary for the safety of the flight, and must notify the pilot in command. The agency involved must comply with all such conditions imposed by the operator.

For compliance with rule 108.55(b)(7), the practices and procedures documented in the programme should address the following:

- (a) the procedures for considering each case and imposing conditions upon the travel that are sufficient to minimise the risk to the flight, other passengers, and crew, arising from the carriage of such people:
- (b) the procedures for declining to accept carriage of the person where the operator considers that the circumstances are such that safety cannot be reasonably assured:
- (c) where the travel involves the passenger transferring to a flight of another operator at any point of the journey, the procedures for ensuring, before the flight begins, that the other operators have been advised of the travel and have arranged conditions on that travel:
- (d) the following provisions are required only in respect of the carriage of people in custody in accordance with rule 108.5(c)–
  - (1) people-in-custody must not be transported on board an international regular air transport passenger service unless escorted by one or more escorting people:
  - (2) the operator must not accept a prisoner for carriage on an international regular air

- transport passenger service unless approval has been obtained in advance from other
- (3) States that may be involved en-route and at the final destination:
  - (4) escorts must ensure that the person-in-custody does not carry any potentially dangerous items that could be used as a weapon:
  - (5) escorts are to be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event that restraint is necessary. Such restraint should not, under normal circumstances, include the prisoner being shackled to any part of the aircraft:
  - (6) escorts are to adequately identify themselves to security personnel and law enforcement officers on duty at the point of departure, where appropriate on board the aircraft, and at any transit or transfer stop during the journey:
  - (7) the operator must ensure that the pilot in command and the senior cabin crew member on board are appraised of the fact that there is a prisoner, or are prisoners, and escorts on the flight, of the security precautions being taken, and of the seating arrangements:
  - (8) escorted people are to be emplaned before the other passengers, and deplaned after all other passengers have left the aircraft:
  - (9) people in custody and their escorts are to be seated as far to the rear of the aircraft as possible, but not immediately adjacent to any exit door:
  - (10) where the aircraft seating configuration permits, people in custody are to be seated in a row of two or more seats and at least one escort should be seated between the person in custody and the aisle. In aircraft where this is not possible, the escort will be seated immediately opposite the person under escort:
  - (11) people in custody should be accompanied at all times, including visits to the lavatory:
  - (12) no intoxicating liquor must be served to either people in custody or escorts, but food may be served at the discretion of the escort. People in custody are not to be provided with metal utensils for eating:
  - (13) in the case of people considered to be particularly dangerous by the escorting agency or on the evaluation of the operator, at least two escorts are to be provided. No more than one such person in custody and escorts are to be carried on any one flight:
  - (14) in any circumstances, the operator is to limit the number of people in custody carried on any one flight in accordance with rule 108.53(c) to—
    - (i) one person in custody on aircraft with up to 20 passenger seats
    - (ii) one further person in custody for each additional 25 seats See Table 1 on the maximum number per seating capacity.
- (d) the carriage of mentally disturbed people, who, in the opinion of the operator or the agency responsible for the person, are considered to be dangerous, may be accepted for transportation under the following provisos—
- (1) they are accompanied by attendants physically capable of restraining such people if necessary; or
  - (2) the attendants are capable of administering medication as may be required; or
  - (3) where a mentally disturbed person requires sedation prior to departure, each portion of the flight should last no longer than the effective duration of the sedative administered.
- (e) deportees, and other people travelling under administrative procedures, are to be evaluated, for their propensity to endanger the safety or security of the flight. This evaluation is to be carried out by a responsible representative of the operator. Where the operator's

representative considers that any risk to safety exists, the operator's security personnel or advisers should be consulted. Based upon such an evaluation, the operator may arrange for additional security measures, as are appropriate in the circumstances, sufficient to ensure the safety of other people on board and of the flight.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(9) Control of transit and transfer passengers and their carry-on baggage**

This rule requires an air operator to establish and include, in their respective air operator security programmes, practices and procedures for security screening of transit and transfer passengers and their cabin baggage to prevent unauthorised articles being taken on board an aircraft. The practices and procedures to be established and implemented are to be appropriate to prevent the risk of unauthorised articles being taken on board by this means. They must ensure that transit and transfer passengers do not have access to their screened hold-stow baggage unless authorised and under supervision of the Aviation Security Service or the air operator, or have contact with other people who have not been screened.

#### **Increased level of threat – disembarking passengers**

This rule requires procedures to be documented for situations where the operation is under an increased level of threat to ensure that disembarking passengers do not leave items on board the aircraft. This requirement applies to operations in respect of aircraft in transit through any Papua New Guinea aerodrome, in the case of a Part 129 operator, and through any aerodrome in the case of Part 119 operators.

For compliance, the procedures must require the inspection of those areas of the aircraft reasonably accessible to passengers for unauthorised articles before departure and following any transit stop.

Such checks may be carried out by the aircraft crew, or ground personnel, provided they are sufficiently trained to appreciate the purpose and nature of the check and are briefed to refer any items found to competent security personnel.

- (a) To facilitate these checks, transit passengers leaving the aircraft during the transit stop should be required to take all articles of hand baggage off the aircraft. Any passengers remaining on board must identify to crew members the items of their hand baggage.
- (b) Any item found on board an aircraft in transit which cannot be matched to a boarding passenger, a re-boarding passenger, or a passenger who has remained on board, should be treated as a suspect item until cleared.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(10) Protection of cargo, baggage, mail, aircraft supplies, catering supplies, stores and other operators supply during movement within an aerodrome.**

This rule requires procedures describing how cargo, baggage, mail, stores, and aircraft supplies, intended for carriage on international passenger aircraft, are to be handled and moved. This is regardless of whether the handling is in a secure or non-secure environment.

The handling is to be under appropriate supervision to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives, or any other dangerous devices.

#### **Cargo and Mail**

Cargo and mail should be stored within an access controlled area at the aerodrome as per the requirements of rule 108.55(d)(1). Further detail in this regard can be found under rule 109.53 in Advisory Circular AC 109-1.

Reference made to an aerodrome in this context includes any buildings, installations, and equipment on or adjacent to any such area used in connection with the aerodrome or its administration as defined in CAR Part 1 and the Civil Aviation Act 2000.

## **Baggage**

An air operator security programme must include procedures to prevent unauthorised access to passenger baggage from the time of its acceptance by the air operator and while it is being moved within the aerodrome. Baggage must be maintained in a secure environment at all times while in the custody of the air operator. Normal access controls in place at aerodromes servicing international departures provide a level of security assurance for bags being screened in baggage make-up areas due to the siting of those areas within the security enhanced area.

### **Protection of hold baggage**

Access to areas where hold baggage is present should be controlled to prevent unauthorized access, tampering and the introduction of restricted articles or explosive devices into hold baggage. This may require security measures for baggage storage areas, transfer areas, apron areas and the baggage handling system.

Hold baggage should be protected from unauthorized interference from the point at which it is accepted, including off-airport check-in locations, until its departure on an aircraft. Screened hold baggage should be kept under surveillance at all times. In increased threat situations, it may be necessary to provide an escort from the baggage sorting area to the aircraft, or to convey baggage in an enclosed and locked vehicle or trolley.

*Measures to be taken in protecting hold baggage:*

- (a) prior to being loaded, hold baggage must be held in the baggage sorting area or other storage area of an airport to which only authorized persons may have access;
- (b) any person entering a baggage make-up or storage area without authorization should be challenged and escorted out of the area;
- (c) originating and transfer hold baggage, including tail-to-tail transfer hold baggage whenever permissible, should not be left unattended on the apron or alongside an aircraft; and
- (d) access to lost-and-found offices in the passenger terminal should be restricted to prevent tampering with misplaced baggage.

Baggage for which the owner is being sought and in the meantime is retained by the airport operator, or validated baggage that cannot be immediately loaded, such as baggage checked in at an off-airport location, and whose safekeeping is the responsibility of the aircraft operator, must be kept in secure areas monitored by security personnel.

### **Stores and Aircraft Supplies**

This requirement relates to stores and aircraft supplies, including catering. Documented procedures must ensure that stores, aircraft supplies and catering are handled in a secure environment.

Transport of stores and aircraft supplies within the aerodrome must be in a manner to ensure that no weapons, explosives, or any other dangerous devices capable of being used to commit an act of unlawful interference with an aircraft are placed within the stores, aircraft supplies or catering.

Therefore, vehicles, equipment, and containers used for handling and transporting these items to an aircraft must also be kept secure or in a secure environment, or, where this cannot be assured, security inspected before being used.

Where there is reason to suspect that security of cargo, baggage, mail, aircraft supplies, stores, or air operator's supplies may have been compromised while being moved within the aerodrome, the goods are not to be loaded until their security integrity has been confirmed by inspection, or screening, or by other security control measures.

**Rule 108.55(b)(11) Security screening of packages other than cargo or mail**

This rule requires the air operator to establish practices and procedures for the security screening of packages intended for carriage on aircraft where the packages are being carried are not cargo or mail. For specific guidance material on diplomatic mail, refer to the information under rule 108.55(i)(1) in this AC.

The specific security controls required are for the purpose of confirming that no weapon, explosive or dangerous device, article or substance is included in the consignment.

These procedures should include—

- (a) physical search or X-ray examination. In the case of an X-ray examination, if the X-ray operator is not satisfied that the item does not contain any weapon, explosive or dangerous device, article or substance, then a physical search should be undertaken;
- (b) examinations in a secure environment; and
- (c) provision of sufficient security to ensure there is no contamination of the consignment from the completion of inspection until it is loaded and secured in the aircraft hold.

No air operator or an agent of the air operator may permit any courier item to be introduced on board the aircraft unless the item has been examined in accordance with these standards. Security inspections required of such consignments are to be conducted by trained and competent personnel.

**Rule 108.55(b)(12) All passengers and crew members to be screened**

An air operator's security programme must include practices and procedures to ensure that every passenger and crew member, and the carry-on baggage of the passengers and crew members, is screened before boarding an aircraft engaged on an international regular air transport passenger service, unless the person is specifically exempted from screening. This is to prevent the carriage of unauthorised articles into the passenger cabin of an aircraft engaged on an international regular air transport passenger service.

All passenger and baggage screening operations must be conducted in accordance with rule 108.63. Screening carried out in Papua New Guinea must be undertaken by the Aviation Security Service or the holder of an aviation security service certificate issued in accordance with Part 140.

The screening must take place in an environment that prevents any person so screened from having contact with any person or item that has not been subject to security control. In the event that any person travelling on the aircraft has been in contact with people or objects that have not been subject to security control, between the completion of security screening and the closing up of the aircraft for departure, all people boarding, or having boarded, the aircraft for the departure must be re-screened. Where any person refuses to be screened or fails to present their hand baggage for screening, the operator must not permit that person or their baggage to board the aircraft or to come into contact with any person who has been screened.

Royalty and Heads of State of any country, and their spouses, travelling on official business may be exempt from passenger screening. This will only be in circumstances where the security provided the person concerned, and their baggage, has been subjected to effective security provided by their official escorting party. This exemption does not extend to other people travelling with the Royal person or the Head of State.

**Rule 108.55(b)(13) Passenger and baggage re-conciliation**

This rule requires the air operator to establish and include, in their security programmes, practices and procedures for a positive and accurate reconciliation of passengers and baggage.

These procedures are required to be implemented in addition to any other security measures that may have been afforded a passenger's checked baggage. The procedures must be sufficient to confirm that

all people who check-in for an international flight, whether as joining, transit, or transfer passengers, board or re-board the aircraft. In every case where checked baggage has been accepted and the passenger fails to board or re-board the aircraft, the baggage must not be loaded,

or, if already loaded, must be removed from the aircraft before departure. Such baggage must not be reloaded onto any international passenger aircraft until it has been subjected to specific inspection by trained and competent security staff. In addition to any X-ray or other technical examination, the inspection must include detailed physical inspection.

The security programme procedures may provide for baggage to remain on board an aircraft in circumstances where the passenger is unable to embark or re board under the following circumstances that are clearly and verifiably beyond the control of the passenger—

- (a) in the event of the passenger's death after check-in and before the aircraft departure; or
- (b) if the passenger elects to off-load himself or herself at an alternative airport as a result of diversion to that airport by the operator due to operational factors alone, such as flight delays or flight cancellation for weather or mechanical reasons, or for operational conditions at the originally planned aerodrome of arrival; or
- (c) if the operator reroutes the baggage of a passenger because of weight, or similar operational requirements, that could not have been anticipated by the passenger at the time the baggage was checked in with the airline.

Any such procedure needs to include a documented decision making process that includes consultation with the pilot in command of the departing aircraft. Rule Part 108.55(b)(17) also applies to passenger and baggage re-conciliation.

#### **Rule 108.55(b)(14) Pre-flight checks of originating aircraft**

This rule requires an air operator to establish procedures for carrying out pre-flight checks of originating aircraft. These procedures are for the purpose of discovering unauthorised items or any anomalous circumstances that could indicate the possible concealment of weapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices on the aircraft.

*Originating aircraft* is defined in CAR Part 1 and means any aircraft about to be used on a regular air transport passenger service from any Papua New Guinea aerodrome that has been emptied of passengers and goods at the conclusion of a previous flight. This does not include any aircraft transiting Papua New Guinea or any Papua New Guinea airport in circumstances where either passengers or goods are added to an existing load.

Searches for compliance with this rule may be carried out by the aircraft flight or cabin crew as a part of their pre-boarding procedures. Searches by trained and competent security personnel are only required where the aircraft has changed from being used on a service carrying unscreened people to an international service.

#### **Rule 108.55(b)(15) Baggage originating other than at airport check-in**

This rule does not apply to baggage accepted for carriage as air cargo through normal air cargo facilities and under air cargo security arrangements.

The rule requires air operators to establish procedures to provide security of baggage:

- (a) that because of its size, or for any other reason, is accepted for carriage other than at a normal airport check-in:
- (b) that is unaccompanied or unidentified baggage:
- (c) that originates from an off-airport check-in:
- (d) that originates from a kerb-side check-in.

Security procedures for such baggage are to include approved hold baggage screening methods, in

accordance with Rule 108.63 to ensure that any such item does not contain any weapon or device that could be used to commit an act of unlawful interference with the aircraft. The Hold Baggage Authorisation procedures required by rule 108.55 (b)(17) are also required to be applied.

With respect to (c) and (d) above, the procedures must ensure that the bags are screened and the degree of security of the baggage from check-in, during baggage makeup, and during delivery to the aircraft is maintained to no lesser level than that afforded to baggage at a normal airport check-in.

If an air operator does not contemplate accepting baggage under (c) and (d) above, then a declaration to that effect in the operator's security programme will be sufficient for compliance purposes.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(16) Hold Baggage Screening**

This rule requires procedures to ensure that all hold baggage on an aircraft for an international regular air transport passenger service is screened in accordance with rule 108.63 prior to loading. Acceptable means of compliance procedures for hold baggage screening are detailed in Appendix I.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(17) Hold Baggage Authorisation**

This rule requires procedures to ensure that all hold baggage on an aircraft for an international regular air transport service is authorised for loading into the aircraft. Acceptable means of compliance procedures for hold baggage authorisation are detailed in Appendix II.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(18) Preventing Unauthorised Persons Entering Flight Deck**

This rule requires the air operator to develop procedures and practices relevant to the aircraft type and configuration that will prevent unauthorised persons from gaining access to the aircraft flight deck. These procedures must be included in the security programme or be referenced in the security programme as to their location within other operational manuals required for certification of the airline.

This requirement is not intended to make lockable and/or strengthened cockpit barriers a regulatory requirement but in cases where they fitted, supporting procedures must be developed and implemented to ensure that the maximum possible security benefit is delivered.

In aircraft fitted with cockpit doors and in instances where there is a need to provide access during flight, the procedures must include methods of ensuring that unauthorised access is not gained during any period that a cockpit door is opened.

By way of guidance, in the case of a person wishing to exit the flight deck door, that person should consider the following prior to opening the door:

- (a) verifying with the cabin crew that any adjacent lavatory is not occupied by a passenger:
- (b) determining the circumstances that exist outside the door, particularly on any high risk flight or when an unknown passenger is within easy access of the door:
- (c) confirming that cabin crew are positioned to block passenger access to the door area when it is opened.

It is essential that doors only be opened for the minimum time required to quickly leave or enter the flight deck compartment. Visits to flight decks should be confined to persons authorised by the pilot-in-command and procedures must be established for this. Only persons authorised by the pilot-in-command should be permitted access. Documentation must outline the procedure for authorising a person to access the flight deck and the number of persons should be kept to a minimum.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(19) Threats to Civil aviation and Response to Cyber threats**

The civil aviation operation environment is changing rapidly and significantly with an increasing use of data and the deployment of new and interconnected technologies and communication systems, shifting from manual processes to more efficient automated processes, communications and storage, in order to enhance security and facilitation. The aviation sector is therefore increasingly reliant on the

availability of information, communications and control systems, as well as on the integrity and confidentiality of data. Each certificate holder/ stakeholder in the aviation system should therefore identify its critical aviation information systems and implement protective measures using a risk assessment methodology, followed by the essential measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and, when necessary, to respond appropriately to an incident.

Attacks on critical information and communication infrastructures have the potential to create substantial damage and disruption to services and also result in the potential compromise of information relating to sensitive security measures. Therefore, in line with Annex 17 Aviation Security, Standard 4.9.1 Measures relating Cyber threats, all certificate holders and stakeholders must:

Criteria for the protection of critical information and communications technology systems and data used for civil aviation purposes from unlawful interference:

**(1) Identification & Classification**

- (a) Inventory of Critical Assets
  - Identify and maintain an up-to-date inventory of ICT systems and data critical to aviation safety, security, and operations.
- (b) Classification by Criticality
  - Classify assets based on operational impact (e.g., safety-critical, security-critical, facilitation-critical).

**(2) Risk Assessment**

- (a) Holistic Threat Modeling
  - Conduct structured, risk-based threat assessments to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities in accordance to ASRAM Document.
- (b) Risk Register
  - Maintain a centralized register of risks and associated mitigation measures.

**(3) Protective Measures**

- (a) Administrative Controls
  - Policies, Procedures, and security awareness training
  - Defined roles, responsibilities, and segregation of duties
  - Personnel vetting and background checks
- (b) Technical Controls
  - Firewalls, IDS/IPS, and endpoint protection
  - Network segmentation for safety and security domains
  - Data encryption (in transit and at rest)
  - Multi-factor authentication and strict access controls
- (c) Physical Controls
  - Secure data centers and server rooms with limited access
  - Surveillance and intrusion detection systems
  - Access logs and physical entry controls

**(4) Continuous Monitoring**

- (a) Implement Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM)
- (b) Use Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems
- (c) Perform routine log analysis, vulnerability scans, and system audits

**(5) Incident Detection & Response**

- (a) Real-time monitoring and alerting of anomalies
- (b) Clear incident response plan with severity classification
- (c) Crisis communication plan and notification protocols
- (d) Post-incident review and lessons learned

**(6) Supply Chain Security**

- (a) Vet suppliers for cybersecurity practices
- (b) include security clauses in contracts and SLAs
- (c) Monitor third-party compliance and system updates

**(7) Training & Awareness**

- (a) Regular cybersecurity training for all aviation stakeholders
- (b) Specialized training for ICT personnel and incident responders
- (c) Simulation exercises (e.g., Tabletop Exercises)

**(8) Post Event Analysis**

- (a) Once an incident response has been concluded and aviation operations restored to a normal operating mode, conducting a thorough analysis of the event is a critical step in ensuring that there is no future recurrence.
- (b) Analysis should be performed with third party system providers, manufacturers or appropriate authority to help identify the root causes and identify cross-references to existing safety analyses/documentation.
- (c) All findings and final recommendations should be shared with states and the aviation industry stakeholders so that they may adjust their respective cybersecurity governance approach and programme.

**Rule 108.55(b)(20) Conduct of background checks**

This rule requires the air operator to establish process for the requirements of background checks to be completed

- (a) Persons implementing security controls, persons with unescorted access to security restricted areas, and persons with access to sensitive aviation security information prior to taking up these duties or accessing such areas or information. A background check must be done to confirm a person's identity and previous work experience, including criminal history when legally permissible, whenever appropriate, should be carried out as part of the assessment of the individual's suitability for unescorted access to airside and security restricted areas.
- (b) The recurrent background checks are applied to such persons on an interval of not more than two years. Background checks should be updated on a regular basis to ensure that the individual still meets the required criteria. A good practice is to update a background check every time airport security identification permits need to be renewed

- (c) Persons found unsuitable by any background checks are immediately denied the ability to implement security controls, unescorted access to security restricted areas, and access to sensitive aviation security information.
- (d) permit should not be issued if, during the performance of a background check, it is determined that the applicant was convicted of:
- (e) certain crimes, specifically possession or use of illicit drugs, trafficking in illicit drugs, trafficking in weapons or illegal possession of weapons, aggravated assault, extortion, acts
- (f) endangering public safety including acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, sexually-related offences or membership in a criminal organization.
- (g) In exceptional circumstances, the national authority may determine that the applicant has been fully rehabilitated and no longer constitutes a risk; and
- (h) other relevant offences such as burglary, dealing of stolen goods, embezzlement, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, without making restitution.

Applicants for jobs implementing security controls should undergo a supplementary check to confirm that they are not associated with a terrorist organization. Generally, these duties involve controlling access to and searching security restricted areas and aircraft, issuing identification permits to persons or for vehicles, or managing any persons performing these functions.

- (a) Details of the disqualification criteria after completion of a background check must be documented.
- (b) All records of the disqualification must be maintained and securely stored.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(21) Procedures dealing with unidentified baggage and suspicious objects**

Aircraft operators are required to establish procedures to deal with unidentified baggage and suspicious objects in accordance with a risk assessment.

The objective of hold baggage screening is to prevent prohibited items from entering security restricted areas and being placed on board an aircraft in hold baggage. All originating and transfer baggage should undergo screening. Transfer baggage may be exempted from screening if the State has established an arrangement with another State and each State is satisfied that passenger hold baggage is appropriately screened at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized interference up to the point of departure at the transfer airport. Such arrangements should be based on bilateral agreements, an MoU or one-stop security agreements.

Person and baggage reconciliation should be performed in addition to other security measures, such as screening, aimed at ensuring that hold baggage does not contain any suspicious objects or explosives or explosive devices.

All unidentified baggage should be treated as suspect and handled in accordance with local laws and/or the NCASP. No unidentified baggage should be transported by air unless a definite link can be established with a passenger who travelled and has made a missing baggage claim, and the baggage has been subjected to appropriate screening. Such screening should be defined by the appropriate authority and may include security controls designed to ensure that the baggage has not been tampered with and that no unauthorized access occurred from the time it was originally screened to the time it was recovered.

If a passenger fails to board a flight, or disembarks before departure, the passenger's baggage should be offloaded from the aircraft and either:

- a) directed to another flight on which the passenger is scheduled to travel, thereby re-establishing its status as accompanied baggage; or

b) subjected to appropriate screening before carriage, provided the offloading was a consequence beyond the passenger's control.

If a passenger travels as intended, but his or her baggage fails to make the flight because of a major disruption to airport operations or an unplanned operational constraint, and becomes unaccompanied, the history of the baggage from the point of check-in, i.e. its provenance, may constitute an acceptable means of security control.

The screening of hold baggage may be carried out by manual searches, X-ray equipment or other detectors of explosives and dangerous substances, or by a combination of manual procedures and equipment. In the interest of facilitation, the amount of baggage to be manually searched may be minimized by using contemporary screening equipment in conjunction with appropriate procedures conducted by well-trained and skilled personnel.

All baggage should be screened or searched by means that are acceptable to the relevant regulatory body. It is recommended that security staff adopt a principle by which all baggage retains an uncleared status until positively cleared, that is, each item of baggage to be examined is treated as uncleared unless it can be determined that the baggage and its contents do not include prohibited items. If baggage screened by X-ray has not been cleared, it should be further examined in an attempt to resolve the cause of concern. Baggage should not be allowed to proceed for carriage until such concerns are resolved fully and effectively. If the status of an item of baggage remains ambiguous, the baggage should be treated as uncleared and subjected to further appropriate screening procedures. X-ray operators should reject or subject to further screening any baggage about which they have any reservation or doubt.

#### **Rule 108.55(b)(22) Use of appropriate screening methods for detecting explosives and explosive devices**

The objective of screening of persons/ passengers/ carry-on baggage/ hold baggage is to prevent prohibited items from entering security restricted areas and being placed on board an aircraft in hold baggage. All originating and transfer baggage should undergo screening.

All passengers, together with items carried, prior to boarding an aircraft must be screened to ensure that they are not carrying prohibited items such as explosives and explosive devices on their persons, in carry-on baggage or in the hold baggage which could be used to carry out or facilitate an act of unlawful interference.

#### **Rule 108.55(b)(23) Preflight checks of all originating aircrafts**

Aircraft operators have a responsibility to the travelling public and their employees to conduct secure operations. This obligation includes the conduct of aircraft checks and searches, protection of aircraft, aircraft maintenance areas and other restricted areas, and security measures for transit operations, baggage, cargo, mail and catering.

Aircraft operators are required to conduct preflight checks of all originating aircrafts checks and aircraft searches of specific areas and accessible compartments of the interior and exterior of aircraft. Aircraft operators' on-board checklist provides details of aircraft search procedures, including searches for concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, and the appropriate course of action to be taken should a bomb or suspicious object be found.

#### **Rule 108.55(b)(24) Aircraft protection from unauthorized interference**

Aircraft are vulnerable to the introduction of prohibited items not only by passengers, but also, while parked or being prepared for service, by intruders and airport staff. The prevention of unauthorized access to an aircraft depends not only on the application of effective security measures for the area in

immediate proximity of the aircraft, as well as the vicinity of the apron, but also on effective access control measures at the airport level.

Aircraft parked overnight should be parked in controlled and well-illuminated areas. Illumination fixtures, in addition to being connected to the airport's main power supply, should be connected to a secondary power supply. Alternatively, portable lighting should be readily available for use when the main power supply is disrupted.

To ensure aircraft remain protected from unauthorized interference, including when parked overnight, they should either be guarded, or be kept under observation using unpredictably-timed patrols carried out by airport or aircraft operator security staff or law enforcement officers. Patrols are particularly effective during low-level airport operations when only a small number of authorized people are working.

An aircraft subjected to an aircraft security check or aircraft security search must be protected from unauthorised interference, from the time the aircraft security check or aircraft security search has commenced, until the aircraft departs.

### **Rule 108.55(b)(25) Aircraft protection against MANPADs**

Attacks on aircraft engaged in civil air transport by surface-to-air missiles, or man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), have been rare but are not unknown. Successful defence against such an attack is difficult but not impossible and depends on close cooperation and coordination between ground forces, operators, flight crew and ATS.

Aircraft may be vulnerable to a stand-off attack if they use runways and taxiways that pass over public roads and additional physical security measures should be considered to reduce the risk of an attack being mounted from such areas.

Protection from stand-off attacks against aircraft, airport installations and facilities launched from outside an airport perimeter may be achieved through the surveillance of such areas, including patrols of the airport perimeter by suitably equipped and trained security officers, static surveillance from observation posts, or the use of a CCTV system or other detection devices. Special attention should be paid to areas providing cover from observation, such as parking areas, woodlots, residential areas, disused buildings and areas beneath approach and take off corridors.

The defensive measures and procedures against MANPADs will include: aircraft equipment; In-flight procedures, ATS procedures; and ground procedures.

### **Man-portable air defence systems**

Efforts to remove or at least minimize the threat posed to civil aviation by man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and other weapons require a comprehensive approach and responsible State policies. States should implement strict controls on the import, export, transfer, re-transfer and storage of MANPADS and associated technologies, as well as on related training activities, and limit the transfer of MANPADS production capabilities.

The principal civil aviation target for this type of attack is large passenger aircraft that are airborne, whether in take-off, mid-flight or landing mode. Perpetrators in a MANPADS attack are likely to be external to the airport environment, rather than passengers, crew or airport staff. International and regional cooperation can enhance efforts to implement effective and affordable countermeasures to the threat posed by MANPADS. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is an example of an agreement designed to restrict illicit sales and movements of weapons systems and promote intelligence-sharing and related enforcement actions. Through such international legal instruments, States should be able to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, the illicit sale and movement of small arms and light weapons across State borders.

**In addition, Air Operators should consider implementing the following measures to address the threat associated with MANPADS:**

- (a) airport vulnerability assessments (to identify high-risk launch areas);
- (b) patrolling and community awareness;
- (c) training of pilots to use in-flight countermeasures (if available); and
- (d) air traffic control measures.

### **Rule 108.55(c)(1) Cargo and mail received from regulated air cargo agents**

An air operator must have procedures in their security programmes in respect of any cargo or mail received from a regulated air cargo agent (RACA). A list of regulated air cargo agents may be found at [www.casapng.gov.pg](http://www.casapng.gov.pg).

These procedures must ensure that all cargo and mail received by an air operator from a RACA is accompanied by a declaration of security. CAA does not prescribe or mandate the use of any particular form of declaration, only that it contains the necessary information. The information to be contained within the declaration of security is detailed in Appendix A to civil aviation rule Part 109. The declaration of security must be signed by a person authorised by the RACA.

The documented procedures must include the means for the air operator to check that, at the time of accepting a consignment of cargo or mail from a RACA for carriage, the consignment has not been tampered with. The air operator must document these procedures in the security programme or provide direction to the location of the procedures for individual RACAs.

If a consignment of cargo or mail is received from a RACA without a declaration of security, the air operator must apply the appropriate security controls required under rule 108.55(c)(2).

### **Rule 108.55(c)(2) Cargo and mail received from other entities**

An air operator must document the procedures for the receipt of cargo or mail from entities who are not a RACA. These procedures must include the system for implementation of the appropriate security controls as required by rule 108.55(d). However, if the air operator does not intend to accept cargo or mail from any person other than a RACA then the air operator's security programme needs to state that intent and does not need to include procedures under 108.55(d).

### **Rule 108.55(d) Cargo and mail security controls**

If the air operator is to accept cargo or mail from a person who is not a RACA, the air operator must establish appropriate facilities and procedures that are equivalent to those required under the following rules to ensure that the security controls required in rule 108.55(c)(2) meet the requirements of Part 109:

- (a) rule 109.53 (Facility requirements):
- (b) rule 109.55 (Cargo and mail including transfer cargo and mail security control procedures):
- (c) rule 109.57 (Screening procedures of cargo and mail including transfer cargo and mail):
- (d) rule 109.59 (Authorisation procedures of cargo and mail including transfer cargo and mail)
- (e) rule 109.61 (Procedures and register for a known customer):
- (f) rule 109.63 (Procedures for high risk cargo or mail):
- (g) rule 109.65 (Training of personnel):
- (h) rule 109.67 (Cargo security incidents):

- (i) rule 109.67 (Records)
- (j) rule 109 Appendix A (Declaration of Security for Cargo and mail including transfer cargo and mail).
- (k) rule 109 Appendix B (Screening Standard for Cargo and mail including transfer cargo and mail).
- (l) rule 109 Appendix C (Training Standard for Cargo and mail including transfer cargo and mail).

Advisory information regarding the above requirements is available in Advisory Circular AC 109-1.

**Rule 108.55(e) Cargo and mail security controls included in security programmes**

Relevant documented procedures for the security controls in accordance with 108.55(d) need not be individually contained within the air operators' security programme. However, as required by Part 108 the security programme will, at a minimum, need to contain a generic outline of these procedures and information that identifies the specific documentation that contains the detailed procedures in question.

**Rule 108.55 (f) Procedures for carriage of any person in legal custody**

The air operator must establish procedures for the carriage of any person in legal custody, this procedures are detailed in rule 108.55 (b)(8). This shall include procedures to ensure that, in relation to the carriage of any person in legal custody on a regular air transport passenger service, that —

- (a) the person is escorted, if so required;
- (b) the escort confirms that the person is not carrying any item that may be used as a weapon;
- (c) the escort is equipped with adequate devices for restraining the person;
- (d) the pilot-in-command and senior flight attendant are notified of the location of, and nature of available documents for the person;
- (e) alcoholic beverages are not served to the person or the person's escort;
- (f) metal utensils are not provided for the person's use;
- (g) the person is not seated in a seat or seat row next to an emergency exit;
- (h) the person is seated appropriately to ensure safe conduct of the flight is achieved;
- (i) no more than one person in custody is carried on an aircraft with a certificated passenger seating capacity of 20 seats or less and no more than one additional person in custody is carried for each additional 25 seats of certificated passenger seating capacity;
- (j) a risk assessment is completed and any other pertinent information provided, including the reason for assigning or not assigning an escort is provided;
- (k) give at least 24 hours written notice to the aircraft operator before the intended departure of a potentially disruptive person, and those who have been subjected to judicial or administrative proceedings; and
- (l) notify the inbound aircraft operator without delay on the same day as the passenger's arrival of the need to transport a potentially disruptive person, and those who have been subjected to judicial or administrative proceedings;
- (m) the air operators or pilot in command's have the right to deny carriage based on the air operator's policy concerning the number of such persons that may be transported on a

given flight, or when reasonable concerns exist in regard to the safety and security of the flight in question.

### **Rule 108.55(g) Passenger and baggage accepted for trans-shipment to international air services**

This rule requires procedures to be documented, for the handling of passenger baggage, where the domestic air operator accepts baggage for domestic carriage before transshipment of the baggage to an international air service. The procedures must establish a level of security of the baggage from check-in until it is received by the international operator that is no less secure than that afforded international baggage received directly by the international operator. These procedures must also provide the means for ensuring that domestic baggage transferring to an international departure is screened in accordance with Rule 108.63.

### **Rule 108.55(h) International transfer and transit baggage screening**

Hold baggage transiting Papua New Guinea or transferring from an international flight to another international flight departing Papua New Guinea will not be required to be re-screened where the Director has established a validation process and continuously implemented procedures in collaboration with another contracting state where appropriate, to ensure that such hold baggage has been screened at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorised interference from the originating airport to the departing aircraft at the transit airport.

unless such validation process is established, screening is required by this Rule. In any such case when screening is required, the airline operators will need to transport the baggage to the Aviation Security Service for screening prior to onward travel.

### **Rule 108.55(i) Diplomatic mail**

Official sealed diplomatic pouches that are clearly and appropriately marked and identifiable as such and accompanied by signed documentation from an official of the dispatching diplomatic agency are not required to undergo the security controls required in accordance with 108.55(c)(1)&(2).

Where diplomatic mail is accompanied by a courier the personal baggage of the courier must be screened in accordance with normal passenger screening requirements in this advisory circular.

### **Rule 108.57 (a) Security clearance of flights**

For compliance with this rule, procedures are required to ensure that none of the air operator's aircraft depart unless all applicable security requirements for that flight have been complied with.

Procedures must ensure that prior to the departure of an aircraft, a responsible airline representative such as the Duty Manager is to certify that the security procedures prescribed in the air operator's security programme have been complied with for the particular departure.

Where the organisation has a documented and implemented quality control system the clearance may be automatic. The system must involve regular and documented quality checks of relevant security procedures by local management and programmed documented checks by the operator's security coordinators or other regular internal auditing processes.

The documented checks referred to above need to be of a standard to allow CASA security auditors/inspectors to identify that the operator has in fact been carrying out the relevant checks and that any corrective or preventative actions identified as necessary have been taken.

### **Rule 108.57(b) Appendix A.1**

The air operator and certificate holder must carry out aircraft search in accordance with Rule 108 Appendix A.1

## **Rule 108.59 Training of personnel**

There are variations, with respect to training requirements, between Papua New Guinea air operators certificated under Part 119 and foreign air transport operators certificated under Part 129.

Under Part 119 the training requirement applies to relevant personnel whether they are operating in Papua New Guinea or elsewhere.

For operations under Part 129 the training requirements of this Rule apply only to people employed by the operator, or by agents of the operator, in Papua New Guinea and who are involved in the execution of the air operator's security programme in Papua New Guinea.

Any training required under rule 108.59 is to be carried out by a certified security instructor who has demonstrated competency to the satisfaction of the Chief Executive or a person nominated by the Chief Executive. Certification is a process managed by CASAPNG. The scope of initial and recurrent training needs to be identified and tailored for the different categories of personnel involved in the application of specific security measures contained in the air operator's security programme. Some aspects of training may be the same through all levels of the organisation but will vary in the depth of knowledge to be imparted.

An example of this would be the legal responsibilities of the air operator's organisation under the air operator security programme and Part 108. While senior management and senior supervisory personnel need to be trained to the extent of having an in-depth knowledge of the legal responsibilities and the resulting liability of the airline, others with lesser responsibilities need only be trained in those aspects pertinent to their level of involvement. A simple and adequate method of developing, planning, and documenting the scope of training, is the use of a *matrix chart*. By this method, each category of staff whose activities involve security is listed on the vertical axis and the various training modules required on the horizontal axis. By this means the training element scope for each category can be readily identified and composite training programmes developed.

Recurrent training, normally at not more than 24-month intervals, should include refresher training on basic elements and instruction on—

- (a) changes in regulatory requirements and standards; and
- (b) changes to the organisation's procedures and programme; and
- (c) changes to the threat factor affecting the organisation's operations.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(1)(i & ii) Applicable segment of initial and recurrent training**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures to ensure that applicable segments for initial training and recurrent training are provided to personnel in line with their specific jobs and security responsibility.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(2) Competency assessment**

This rule requires the air operator to establish appropriate knowledge testing and competency assessments for the training conducted.

### **Assessment of training**

Tests must be objective, standardized, robust and sufficiently challenging in order to validate that personnel understand their roles, responsibilities, and the associated procedures beyond just general knowledge. Proper test construction procedures must be applied and the validity, reliability and impartiality of the test must be demonstrable. Test validation should provide an operationally-based assessment of on-the-job performance.

Theoretical exams shall be based on the content of the training and there must be a sufficient range of test questions to ensure a reliable, valid and standardized basis for certification. The practical exams

must test for the following competencies:

- a) ability to operate the security equipment used on site and understanding of related safety issues; and
- b) ability to use the correct procedures.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(2) Standards of performance**

This rule requires the air operator to establish a process for relevant standard of performance for persons implementing security controls and that initial and periodic assessments must be introduced to, maintained those standards.

### **Certification process**

Certification and competency assessments are vital in improving aviation security. The main purpose of a certification process is to ensure that adequate aviation security standards are consistently and reliably achieved. As part of the quality control system, the certification process should provide important information on the strengths and weaknesses of aviation security procedures in general, as well as those of the individuals. It is also a valuable basis for qualifying personnel, measuring training effectiveness, improving training procedures and increasing motivation.

Certification is a formal evaluation and confirmation by, or on behalf of, the appropriate training organisation. This is to ensure that a person possesses the necessary competencies to perform assigned functions to an acceptable level, as defined by the appropriate training requirement.

Therefore, the appropriate training organisation must require use of a certification process to objectively measure performance. This process must be fair, timely, reliable, valid and standardized.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(2)(iv) Competencies of persons implementing security controls**

This rule requires the air operator to develop policies and procedures to ensure that persons implementing security controls must possess all competencies required to perform their duties and are appropriately selected and trained and that the appropriate records are maintained up to date.

The certificate holder must ensure that persons implementing security controls possess the necessary competencies and are appropriately trained and certified to implement security controls.

All persons carrying out screening operations are qualified and certified through the certification system approved by the Director.

All training records and records of appropriate competencies required for the implementation of security controls must be maintained and up to date.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(3) Syllabi**

This rule requires the air operator to develop training syllabi for applicable security control functions as listed in rule 108.59(a)(3)(i-xiii) for Initial & Recurrent training, *Security Awareness training (initial & recurrent)*, and *core training*.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(4)(i)**

This rule requires that training in paragraph (a)(1) must be conducted by the holder of a Part 141 certificate that authorizes the conduct of such a course.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(4)(ii) Certification system**

This rule requires the air operator ensure the development and implementation of an instructor certification system in accordance with the NCASP. The main purpose of certification is to ensure that all security instructors can demonstrate an acceptable minimum standard of pedagogical competence and subject matter knowledge.

It should also ensure that all security instructors are capable of consistently and reliably delivering instruction that achieves adequate operational standards of trained staff. Certification processes should, at the minimum, include the following elements:

- (a) confirm their identity;
- (b) confirm a background check on the candidate has been carried out to ensure their suitability to be an aviation security instructor;
- (c) confirm pedagogical competence;
- (d) confirm subject matter competence.

On successful completion of the certification process, the candidate should be given an official certificate containing a statement of competence and a validity period. Certification exams and conditions should be conducted by the appropriate training authority.

#### **Rule 108.59 (b)(1) Crew member security programme**

This rule the air operator to establish procedures for crew member security training in ensuring that crew members act in the most appropriate manner to minimise the consequences of act of unlawful interference. The training programme as a minimum may cover the following elements;

- (a) crew determination of the seriousness of any occurrence;
- (b) crew communication and coordination;
- (c) appropriate self-defence responses by the crew;
- (d) use of non-lethal protective devices by crew members;
- (e) crew understanding of behaviour of terrorists so as to facilitate their own ability to cope with hijacker behaviour and passenger responses;
- (f) live situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions;
- (g) flight crew compartment procedures to protect the aeroplane;
- (h) aeroplane search procedures and guidance on least bomb-risk locations where practicable;

#### **Rule 108.59 (b)(2) Training of persons tasks with security procedures**

This rule requires the air operator to establish procedures to ensure that personnel tasked with security procedures detailed in the security programme are sufficiently trained to competently apply preventative security measures and techniques in relation to passenger, baggage, cargo, mail, equipment, stores and supplies intended for carriage on an aircraft to prevent unlawful interference.

#### **Rule 108.59 (b)(3) Basic security awareness training for maintenance personnel**

This rules requires the air operator to establish and develop basic aviation security awareness training for all other personnel employed in the maintenance and servicing of the aircraft have a basic awareness of the air operator and aviation security.

#### **Training programme development**

Training programmes must be developed and maintained in accordance with the PNG NCASTP and only by suitably qualified developers.

In developing an aviation security training programme, it is vital to ensure that:

- (a) established teaching principles are observed;
- (b) training programmes, including initial and refresher training, ensure that staff remain current;

- (c) security awareness training reaches staff at all levels, promoting individual responsibility for security through constant vigilance;
- (d) security staff are properly trained by a certified aviation security instructor; and
- (e) concise directives be included for instructors in the training programme to assist with implementation.

### **Rule 108.59 (a)(1)(ii) Recurrent training segment interval**

This rule requires the air operator to establish Policies and procedures to ensure that every person who is required to be trained undertakes the recurrent training segment of the training programme at an interval of no more than 2 years.

#### **Intervals of recurrent training**

Recurrent training should be provided for the following methods or situations:

- (a) a fixed schedule (e.g. every 12 months) where staff go back into the classroom and receive formal, structured training delivered by a certificated instructor;
- (b) an ongoing recurrent training programme that provides regular (e.g. monthly) feedback and updates on incidents that have occurred and issues at the national and local levels.
- (c) in cases where competencies have not been exercised for more than six months, security staff must receive recurrent training before being allowed to return to security duties; and
- (d) in cases where the security staff has been identified by from security tests and inspections conducted under the NCAQCP.

#### **Initial and recurrent Security Awareness Training**

Air operators are required to establish policies and procedures to ensure that personnel involved with or responsible for the implementation of security measures and those authorised to airside areas undertake initial and recurrent security awareness training.

##### **Initial training**

Specific training according to the duties performed should be delivered to all personnel identified in the PNG NCASTP upon hiring. Records of initial training must be kept for all persons trained for at least the duration of their employment/contract. It is recommended that the training record be transferred to a new employer, when possible.

##### **Security awareness training**

The PNG NCASTP specifies that both security and non-security staff must receive initial security awareness training before being allowed unescorted access to security restricted areas of airports or to secure cargo, inflight supplies or airport supplies areas.

Security awareness training shall promote a positive security culture and result in the following:

- (a) ability to identify potential threats and recognition of suspicious behaviour;
- (b) knowledge of previous acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, terrorist acts and current threats;
- (c) awareness of the relevant legal requirements;
- (d) knowledge of the objectives and organization of aviation security in their working environment;
- (e) knowledge of incident reporting procedures;

- (f) ability to respond appropriately to security-related incidents;
- (g) familiarization of, for applicants for an airport security identification permit, the airport regulations pertaining to the access control system; and
- (h) introduction of aviation security procedures, including the importance of a secure airport environment.

### **Core training — security staff**

The PNG NCASTP does not specify the criteria for all function-specific training of staff delivering security measures, including the contents of the specific modules, before training is delivered. Such training shall include, but a) not be limited to, the following topics:

- (a) current and emerging threats to civil aviation;
- (b) international, regional and national legal requirements for aviation security;
- (c) recognition of explosives, weapons and other restricted items;
- (d) security systems and access control;
- (e) screening technology and techniques;
- (f) screening checkpoint/pre-boarding screening operations;
- (g) search techniques of cabin and hold baggage
- (h) baggage, cargo, in-flight supplies and airport supplies security;
- (i) aircraft security and searches
- (j) incident reporting and alarm resolution procedures;
- (k) security awareness, including awareness training for dangerous goods and their impact on the safety and security of flights;
- (l) customer service skills and how these support effective security; and
- (m) dangerous goods.

### **Recurrent training — security staff**

Personnel competence standards can diminish over time and, therefore, all personnel shall undergo recurrent training at regular intervals to ensure that:

- (a) they maintain and improve their competencies related to their job function(s);
- (b) their needs, based on regular performance monitoring of their operational competence in specific functions, are addressed;
- (c) changes in procedures and equipment are addressed to include the incorporation of recent technological developments; and
- (d) training addresses evolving threats and risks, and includes threat updates and local issues.

## **Rule 108.60 Records**

### **Rule 108.60 (1) Records for segment of training**

This rule the air operator to establish procedures in the air operator security programme for identifying, collecting, indexing, storing, maintaining and disposing of all records that are necessary to provide an accurate record for every person who is required to be trained under rule 108.59.

These procedures must address each segment of training that is undertaken.

**Rule 108.60 (2) Records of knowledge testing and competency assessments**

This rule the air operator to establish procedures in the air operator security programme for identifying, collecting, indexing, storing, maintaining and disposing of all records that are necessary to provide an accurate record for every person who is required to be trained under rule 108.59.

These procedures must address the knowledge testing or competency assessment as appropriate for the training conducted

**Rule 108.61 Incident notification**

Under rule 12.55(d)(5) the reporting of incidents is mandatory.

For Part 119 operators the procedure for notification of security incidents must cover incidents wherever the incident occurs.

For Part 129 operators the procedure must address security incidents which occur within Papua New Guinea or on a flight from Papua New Guinea to its next place of landing.

Examples of incidents to be reported include any—

- (a) act of unlawful interference with an aircraft:
- (b) threat against an aircraft, service or facility:
- (c) failure to apply any security procedure required by these rules where the failure is identified after the departure of a service:
- (d) failure of any Government agency to advise the air operator where a person is required to travel:
- (e) failure to advise the air operator relating to the travel of people under administrative control:
- (f) unauthorised access to aircraft in service:
- (g) failure of passenger or baggage screening, or originating aircraft search, resulting in weapons or devices being found on board any aircraft:
- (h) failure by any other organisation required under the Civil Aviation Rules to discharge a security responsibility that contributes to the security of the air operator's services that has, or could have, compromised the security of any service.

**Rule 108.63 Screening**

This Rule Part creates the obligation on an air operator that requires the screening of passengers, crew, and baggage, as required under 108.53(b)(8), 108.53(b)(9), 108.55(b)(12), and 108.55(b)(16) to be conducted by or under the supervision of, the Aviation Security Service, or the holder of an aviation security service certificate issued in accordance with Part 140.

## Appendix A – Security Operational Standards

Regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons may be conducted prior to commencing each flight, based on a risk assessment conducted by the appropriate authority. A similar search is required when an aircraft is suspected of being the target of an act of unlawful interference. The difference between the two types is only in the degree and thoroughness of the search undertaken, and these will be dictated by the total circumstances applicable to each situation.

Aircraft operators are required to develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of aircraft in service and include this checklist as part of flight crew security kits. Use of such a checklist by ground crews is particularly helpful at locations where the only persons familiar with the particular type or configuration of aircraft are flight crew compartment and cabin crew members.

**Refer to the Guideline below:**

### **A.1 Aircraft search**

- (a) The holder of an air operator certificate shall establish procedures to ensure that, when suitably trained and authorised persons carry out an aircraft search, the search—
  - (1) includes passenger seating, overhead lockers, floor areas, toilets, and other areas to which passengers on previous services could have had ready access; and
  - (2) is of sufficient intensity to discover any restricted article that has been concealed or otherwise introduced on board.
- (b) The air operator certificate holder shall establish procedures to ensure that, when a flight that is assessed to be a high risk flight—
  - (1) the aircraft is subjected to a complete search by suitably trained and authorised persons; and
  - (2) the search is carried out in a planned manner using the operator's search check-list for that aircraft; and
  - (3) the search is of sufficient intensity to discover any restricted article that has been concealed or otherwise introduced on board.
- (c) The certificate holder shall develop procedures to—
  - (1) ensure that a record is made of each search carried out under paragraph (a) or (b), that includes details of—
    - (i) the names of the persons carrying out the search; and
    - (ii) any restricted articles found; and
    - (iii) any disposal action taken; and
  - (2) carry out tests or checks, to confirm the thoroughness of any search and the proficiency of each person authorised to conduct an aircraft search, at least annually

## **Appendix B - Hold Baggage Screening Advisory Information for air operators, aerodrome operators and the Aviation Security Service**

### **1. Acceptable means of compliance – Hold Baggage Screening (HBS)**

- 1.1 Manual search with the passenger present
- 1.2 Conventional X-ray is not viewed as a dedicated explosive detection system. It must be used only in conjunction with another technical process as indicated in the following scenarios.
- 1.3 Conventional X-ray combined with random continuous hand searching of bags presented to security personnel by the passenger and may include trace detection, in a pre-check in or redundancy pre-check-in system.
- 1.4 Conventional X-ray of baggage in the baggage make-up area for redundancy screening. Screening hold baggage by conventional X-ray in the baggage make-up area will need to be supported by another additional measure such as Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD), internal Explosive Trace Detection (ETD), or the viewing of at least two different angle X-ray images.
- 1.5 Screened using an explosives detection system accepted or certified by either the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), or the United Kingdom Department for Transport (UK-DfT). The explosives detection system must be operated in the automated mode, i.e. where the X-ray image of an uncleared bag is presented to the X-ray operator for assessment and decision.
- 1.6 Subjected to decompression in a simulation chamber and subsequently held securely for the remaining period of the estimated flight time prior to it being loaded.
- 1.7 Any other measure approved by the Director from time to time as an enhanced security control measure.
- 1.8 ETD systems in swab mode are suitable for use as a contributor in support of the application of the other technologies or manual hand search. ETD systems cannot be used as the final arbiter in determining that a bag does not contain an explosive device. ETD must be used only when the bag is opened to screen specific single items in the bag, inner lining seams and closure points, as appropriate.
- 1.9 EDD (when applicable) will meet set standards agreed in consultation between the Papua New Guinea police and the Aviation Security Service. EDD can be used in conjunction with an assessment of the total information including reviewing X-ray images, passenger information and prior handling.
- 1.10 Consideration will be given to requests from other States to assess additional measures in support of Papua New Guinea regulated requirements.

### **2. Reject Bags**

- 2.1 For bags rejected at one level there will be a requirement that more in-depth measures be applied to the bags until such time as they are “cleared” or declared a “suspicious bag”.
- 2.2 Where a baggage handling system diverts only uncleared or suspect bags to another level of screening, an alerting system needs to be fitted to alert the system operator when there is a system failure to ensure no uncleared or suspect bags are sent to the baggage make-up area.

### **3. Site of Screening**

- 3.1 Normal access controls in place at aerodromes servicing international departures provide a level of security assurance for bags being screened in baggage make-up areas due to the siting of those areas within the security enhanced area. Physical controls on access are in place and persons entering these areas are required to have an airport identity card which allows for the background checking of those persons.

- 3.2 Additional requirements will be necessary for pre-check in Hold Baggage Screening systems. There will need to be physical barriers separating the pre check-in screening area from the public area. The procedures being carried out should not be able to be viewed by the non-travelling public. Passengers and their carry-on bags will also need to be security screened into this area unless the cleared bag is taken from the screening provider to the check-in by an authorised person and the passenger has had no opportunity to interfere with the bag.

#### **4. International Transfer/Interline Bags**

- 4.1 Hold stowed bags from one international flight arriving in Papua New Guinea and transferring to another international flight departing a Papua New Guinea airport will not require re-screening unless such screening is required the Director has been removed from the security enhanced area or the passenger has had access to the bag. Refer to commentary in the advisory material under Part 108.55(h).

#### **5. Domestic to International Transfer/Interline Bags**

- 5.1 Bags transferring from a domestic flight to an international departure will be screened at the point of international departure from Papua New Guinea. Although some bags will come from domestic airports that may have at some time in the future have a HBS system in place there will be bags transferring to international flights from domestic airports where there is no HBS system in place. Additionally, at some of the airports where a HBS system will be in place it may not be manned or operating at all times. Refer to commentary in the advisory material under rule 108.55 (h).

#### **6. Transit Bags**

- 6.1 Checked bags arriving in Papua New Guinea on an international flight that are remaining on board that aircraft for the duration of the layover and departing on the same aircraft will not be required to be subject to re-screening, provided that an acceptable standard of security has been maintained on the aircraft.

#### **7. Out of Gauge (OOG) or oversized baggage**

- 7.1 Oversize items carried by passengers and accompanying the passenger on that flight and checked in as OOG will be subject to screening. Screening of OOG carried out by conventional single view X-ray will need to be supported by another additional measure such as EDD or ETD.
- 7.2 Where a bag is of such size that it cannot be screened (Super Out of Gauge or SOOG) using available X-ray equipment it will be treated as unknown cargo and the requirements of rule 108.55(b)(6) apply.

#### **8. Excess Baggage**

- 8.1 Excess baggage is baggage over the air operator's allowable weight or amount. If the passenger pays the cost of excess baggage, then that baggage travels on the same aircraft as the passenger as checked baggage. If the excess is not paid, and the passenger still wishes the baggage to be transported the baggage is treated as cargo and is managed through the cargo system and in this case the baggage is termed unaccompanied baggage. Unaccompanied baggage must be subject to the air cargo security controls required for an "unknown shipper" as required by rule 108.55(b)(6).

#### **9. Diversions**

- 9.1 If a flight has been diverted to a port other than its intended arrival point, provided the bags are retained in the hold and an acceptable level of security is maintained, there will be no requirement to re-screen those bags prior to the departure of the aircraft to its intended destination.
- 9.2 Where an international arrival has been diverted to a port other than its intended arrival port and originating passengers join that aircraft for its onward flight, those joining passenger's bags will be subject to screening.

- 9.3 If security has not been maintained on the bags in the hold or they have been removed from the hold and passengers or other unauthorised persons have had access to them, they will require re-screening.

## **10. Early Bags**

- 10.1 All bags on international departures require screening. It is the responsibility of the air operator in coordination with the Aviation Security Service to manage bags checked in early for a flight. Where an air operator accepts early bags they must be assigned to a separate isolated area, to ensure they are not mixed with screened bags, until these bags are screened.

## **11. Mishandled/Expedite Bags**

- 11.1 All bags that are categorised as mishandled or expedite bags must undergo security controls as specified in the HBA policy guidelines.

## **12. Mixing of Screened and Unscreened Bags**

- 12.1 Where domestic bags and international bags mix and are transported on the same conveyor the following will apply:
- (a) For the period of time that international bags are being accepted at check-in domestic bags will require screening.
  - (b) Where a separate domestic belt and international belt merge into a common baggage make- up area or collector belt, local procedures need to be implemented to clearly identify international bags. The application of HBA will provide further assurance.

## **13. Security of Baggage Tags**

- 13.1 The need for strict security controls on baggage tags and tag equipment is essential.

## **14. Group Check-In**

- 14.1 Air operators will need to develop or amend procedures to ensure that group checked baggage is individually identified to an air operator representative before a baggage tag is issued and that the bag is clearly marked with the passenger's name.

## **15. Crew Bags**

- 15.1 Crew bags can be checked in at a non-public check-in counter, but they must be clearly marked with the crew member's name and be individually identified by the crew member to the check-in personnel. Crew baggage will be subject to standard Hold Baggage Screening procedures at that airport.

## **16. Procedures for dealing with suspicious bags**

- 16.1 Procedures acceptable to the Director will need to be developed at airports for dealing with suspicious bags. These procedures will require input from the Aviation Security Service, PNG police, PNG Defence Force, the aerodrome operator and the air operator.

## **17. Dangerous Goods**

- 17.1 Procedures will need to be developed between the Aviation Security Service and the air operator to deal with any Dangerous Goods found during hold bag screening.

## **18. System Redundancy**

- 18.1 In the event of a failure of an integral part of a HBS or Baggage Handling System (BHS) procedures acceptable to the Director need to be developed to provide a redundancy capability for the screening of bags. It is not possible to allow non screening of bags as a redundancy.

**19. Screening equipment image retention**

- 19.1 Images of screened bags will be stored for 36 hours after the flight has departed.

**20. Quality Control processes**

- 20.1 Air operators, aerodrome operators and the Aviation Security Service who have regulatory functions in the system of hold baggage screening must have effective internal quality management control systems and audit processes in place to monitor the compliance with these requirements.

**21. Acceptable means of compliance – Hold Baggage Screening (HBS)**

- 21.1 Manual search with the passenger present
- 21.2 Conventional X-ray is not viewed as a dedicated explosive detection system. It must be used only in conjunction with another technical process as indicated in the following scenarios.
- 21.3 Conventional X-ray combined with random continuous hand searching of bags presented to security personnel by the passenger and may include trace detection, in a pre-check in or redundancy pre-check-in system.
- 21.4 Conventional X-ray of baggage in the baggage make-up area for redundancy screening. Screening hold baggage by conventional X-ray in the baggage make-up area will need to be supported by another additional measure such as Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD), internal Explosive Trace Detection (ETD), or the viewing of at least two different angle X-ray images.
- 21.5 Screened using an explosives detection system accepted or certified by either the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), or the United Kingdom Department for Transport (UK-DfT). The explosives detection system must be operated in the automated mode, i.e. where the X-ray image of an uncleared bag is presented to the X-ray operator for assessment and decision.
- 21.6 Subjected to decompression in a simulation chamber and subsequently held securely for the remaining period of the estimated flight time prior to it being loaded.
- 21.7 Any other measure approved by the Director from time to time as an enhanced security control measure.
- 21.8 ETD systems in swab mode are suitable for use as a contributor in support of the application of the other technologies or manual hand search. ETD systems cannot be used as the final arbiter in determining that a bag does not contain an explosive device. ETD must be used only when the bag is opened to screen specific single items in the bag, inner lining seams and closure points, as appropriate.
- 21.9 EDD (when applicable) will meet set standards agreed in consultation between the Papua New Guinea police and the Aviation Security Service. EDD can be used in conjunction with an assessment of the total information including reviewing X-ray images, passenger information and prior handling.
- 21.10 Consideration will be given to requests from other States to assess additional measures in support of Papua New Guinea regulated requirements.

**22. Reject Bags**

- 22.1 For bags rejected at one level there will be a requirement that more in-depth measures be applied to the bags until such time as they are “cleared” or declared a “suspicious bag”.
- 22.2 Where a baggage handling system diverts only uncleared or suspect bags to another level of screening, an alerting system needs to be fitted to alert the system operator when there is a

system failure to ensure no uncleared or suspect bags are sent to the baggage make-up area.

### **23. Site of Screening**

- 23.1 Normal access controls in place at aerodromes servicing international departures provide a level of security assurance for bags being screened in baggage make-up areas due to the siting of those areas within the security enhanced area. Physical controls on access are in place and persons entering these areas are required to have an airport identity card which allows for the background checking of those persons.
- 23.2 Additional requirements will be necessary for pre-check in Hold Baggage Screening systems. There will need to be physical barriers separating the pre check-in screening area from the public area. The procedures being carried out should not be able to be viewed by the non travelling public. Passengers and their carry-on bags will also need to be security screened into this area unless the cleared bag is taken from the screening provider to the check-in by an authorised person and the passenger has had no opportunity to interfere with the bag.

### **24. International Transfer/Interline Bags**

- 24.1 Hold stowed bags from one international flight arriving in Papua New Guinea and transferring to another international flight departing a Papua New Guinea airport will not require re-screening unless such screening is required the Director has been removed from the security enhanced area or the passenger has had access to the bag. Refer to commentary in the advisory material under Part 108.55(h).

### **25. Domestic to International Transfer/Interline Bags**

- 25.1 Bags transferring from a domestic flight to an international departure will be screened at the point of international departure from Papua New Guinea. Although some bags will come from domestic airports that may have at some time in the future have a HBS system in place there will be bags transferring to international flights from domestic airports where there is no HBS system in place. Additionally, at some of the airports where a HBS system will be in place it may not be manned or operating at all times. Refer to commentary in the advisory material under rule 108.55 (h).

### **26. Transit Bags**

- 26.1 Checked bags arriving in Papua New Guinea on an international flight that are remaining on board that aircraft for the duration of the layover and departing on the same aircraft will not be required to be subject to re-screening, provided that an acceptable standard of security has been maintained on the aircraft.

### **27. Out of Gauge (OOG) or oversized baggage**

- 27.1 Oversize items carried by passengers and accompanying the passenger on that flight and checked in as OOG will be subject to screening. Screening of OOG carried out by conventional single view X-ray will need to be supported by another additional measure such as EDD or ETD.
- 27.2 Where a bag is of such size that it cannot be screened (Super Out of Gauge or SOOG) using available X-ray equipment it will be treated as unknown cargo and the requirements of rule 108.55(b)(6) apply.

### **28. Excess Baggage**

- 28.1 Excess baggage is baggage over the air operator's allowable weight or amount. If the passenger pays the cost of excess baggage, then that baggage travels on the same aircraft as the passenger as checked baggage. If the excess is not paid, and the passenger still wishes the baggage to be transported the baggage is treated as cargo and is managed through the cargo

system and in this case the baggage is termed unaccompanied baggage. Unaccompanied baggage must be subject to the air cargo security controls required for an “unknown shipper” as required by rule 108.55(b)(6).

## **29. Diversions**

- 29.1 If a flight has been diverted to a port other than its intended arrival point, provided the bags are retained in the hold and an acceptable level of security is maintained, there will be no requirement to re-screen those bags prior to the departure of the aircraft to its intended destination.
- 29.2 Where an international arrival has been diverted to a port other than its intended arrival port and originating passengers join that aircraft for its onward flight, those joining passenger's bags will be subject to screening.
- 29.3 If security has not been maintained on the bags in the hold or they have been removed from the hold and passengers or other unauthorised persons have had access to them, they will require re-screening.

## **30. Early Bags**

- 30.1 All bags on international departures require screening. It is the responsibility of the air operator in coordination with the Aviation Security Service to manage bags checked in early for a flight. Where an air operator accepts early bags they must be assigned to a separate isolated area, to ensure they are not mixed with screened bags, until these bags are screened.

## **31. Mishandled/Expedite Bags**

- 31.1 All bags that are categorised as mishandled or expedite bags must undergo security controls as specified in the HBA policy guidelines.

## **32. Mixing of Screened and Unscreened Bags**

- 32.1 Where domestic bags and international bags mix and are transported on the same conveyor the following will apply:
  - (a) For the period of time that international bags are being accepted at check-in domestic bags will require screening.
  - (b) Where a separate domestic belt and international belt merge into a common baggage make-up area or collector belt, local procedures need to be implemented to clearly identify international bags. The application of HBA will provide further assurance.

## **33. Security of Baggage Tags**

- 33.1 The need for strict security controls on baggage tags and tag equipment is essential.

## **34. Group Check-In**

- 34.1 Air operators will need to develop or amend procedures to ensure that group checked baggage is individually identified to an air operator representative before a baggage tag is issued and that the bag is clearly marked with the passenger's name.

## **35. Crew Bags**

- 35.1 Crew bags can be checked in at a non public check-in counter, but they must be clearly marked with the crew member's name and be individually identified by the crew member to the check-in personnel. Crew baggage will be subject to standard Hold Baggage Screening procedures at that airport.

**36. Procedures for dealing with suspicious bags**

- 36.1 Procedures acceptable to the Director will need to be developed at airports for dealing with suspicious bags. These procedures will require input from the Aviation Security Service, PNG police, PNG Defence Force, the aerodrome operator and the air operator.

**37. Dangerous Goods**

- 37.1 Procedures will need to be developed between the Aviation Security Service and the air operator to deal with any Dangerous Goods found during hold bag screening.

**38. System Redundancy**

- 38.1 In the event of a failure of an integral part of a HBS or Baggage Handling System (BHS) procedures acceptable to the Director need to be developed to provide a redundancy capability for the screening of bags. It is not possible to allow non screening of bags as a redundancy.

**39. Screening equipment image retention**

- 39.1 Images of screened bags will be stored for 36 hours after the flight has departed.

**40. Quality Control processes**

- 40.1 Air operators, aerodrome operators and the Aviation Security Service who have regulatory functions in the system of hold baggage screening must have effective internal quality management control systems and audit processes in place to monitor the compliance with these requirements.

## **Appendix C - Hold Baggage Authorisation advisory material for air operators**

### **1. Purpose**

- 1.1** This material outlines acceptable means of compliance for “Hold Baggage Authorisation” (HBA). HBA is also known as Account for and Authorise (AAA).
- 1.2** There is a relationship between hold baggage screening and hold baggage authorisation. These processes through which the baggage is handled and the environment in which baggage is handled or moved is intended to contribute to the total security process. HBA is dependent on all the security processes having been effectively completed. Specific evidence of HBS will not be required as part of hold baggage authorisation provided each of the parties involved has an effective internal quality control system in place which maintains the integrity of the process which that party is undertaking or providing.

### **2. Outcomes Sought**

- 2.1** The outcomes from Hold Baggage Authorisation are:
- 2.2** The only hold baggage that has been loaded on a flight is that of:
  - (a) the boarded passengers or crew of the relevant flight; or
  - (b) expedite baggage which has been through enhanced security controls.
- 2.3** International transfer hold baggage is visually or electronically identifiable and security control processes exist to ensure no unauthorised transfer baggage is loaded into the hold.
- 2.4** Expedite baggage is visually or electronically identifiable and has been subject to enhanced security controls.
- 2.5** Creation of a hold baggage manifest prior to departure which:
  - (a) identifies the flight:
  - (b) lists all hold baggage, including expedite, transfer, gate and crew baggage:
  - (c) records which passenger or crew member is associated with each bag:
  - (d) records whether baggage is accompanied baggage or expedite baggage:
  - (e) provides evidence that any expedite baggage has been through enhanced security controls:
  - (f) confirms that all items of hold baggage have been authorised to be carried on the particular flight.

### **3. Applicability**

- 3.1** It is intended that the HBA requirements will apply to all flights covered by rule 108.55 (regular international air transport passenger services with aircraft of more than 9 passenger seats) including those involving off airport check in.

### **4. Automated Systems**

- 4.1** Automated electronic baggage reconciliation systems to facilitate the discharge of these obligations and for a more accurate passenger/ baggage reconciliation to be achieved (compared with manual systems) are encouraged.

### **5. Requirements**

#### **5.1 Hold Baggage Manifest**

- 5.1.1 It is necessary to ensure that each item of hold baggage loaded onto the aircraft is recorded (accounted for) on a hold baggage manifest. The manifest must identify which entries relate to accompanied hold baggage and which relate to expedite baggage, crew baggage and gate baggage. Identification on the hold baggage manifest of expedite bags is sufficient for the purposes of identifying accompanied bags as, by definition, any bag that is not expedite is accompanied.

## **5.2 Baggage Identification and Authorization**

- 5.2.1 Each baggage tag should, either electronically or visually, show the flight number, date and baggage tag number.

As each bag is loaded onto the aircraft, into a baggage container or onto a baggage trolley in the baggage sorting area for transport to the aircraft, it is necessary to:

- (a) confirm the bag is intended to be carried on that flight; and
- (b) confirm that the passenger associated with the bag has checked in or, in the case of expedite baggage, that evidence of enhanced security controls is present; and
- (c) electronically or manually create a hold baggage manifest detailing each bag loaded for that particular flight.

## **5.3 Baggage Identification and Authorization – Pooled bags**

- 5.3.1 Pooling of bags between passengers is permitted but if any member of the pool does not travel after having checked in bags for carriage then all bags in that pool are required to be physically identified by travelling passengers. A member of the pool cannot take responsibility for the bags of another member who is not travelling without the bags being physically identified.

## **5.4 Baggage Identification and Authorization - Transfer Hold Baggage**

- 5.4.1 Transfer baggage is subject to the same authorisation requirements under rule 108.55(b)(17), provided that:

- (a) transfer baggage will need to be electronically or visually identifiable as such.
- (b) transfer baggage, with the exception of that whose most recent point of departure before arrival in Papua New Guinea is an unapproved airport, which remains in a dedicated transfer baggage container may be reconciled from electronic records rather than the actual bag tags.
- (c) transfer baggage whose most recent point of departure before arrival in Papua New Guinea is an unapproved airport will require reconciliation from actual bag tags.

## **5.5 Baggage Identification and Authorization - Gate Baggage**

- 5.5.1 Gate Baggage is subject to the same authorisation requirements under rule 108.55(b)(17) provided that:

- (a) a bag tag must be attached to gate baggage at the time it is taken from the passenger:
- (b) the bag tag number and passenger name must be manually or electronically recorded and added to or appended to the hold baggage manifest:
- (c) pre-tagged gate items and gate items able to be added to the airline DCS do not have to appear on any separate gate bag manifest as long as they are recorded on the main hold baggage manifest that lists all hold baggage.

## **5.6 Baggage Identification and Authorization - Crew baggage and company mail**

- (a) Crew baggage is subject to the same authorisation requirements under Rule 108.55(b)(17).

- (b) Company mail is to be treated as expedite baggage and subject to appropriate security controls and included in the hold baggage manifest.

## **5.7 Baggage Identification and Authorization - Expedite baggage**

- 5.7.1 Expedite baggage must be accounted for as part of, and clearly identified on, the hold baggage manifest. Expedite baggage may be accounted for on a separate hold baggage record from that used for accompanied hold baggage.
- 5.7.2 Each item of expedite baggage must be subjected to at least one enhanced security control measure. Exemptions provided in this Advisory Circular for rule 108.55(b)(13)(c) still apply in cases where the operator reroutes the baggage because of weight or other operational requirements.
- 5.7.3 Tangible evidence must be provided to the appointed person that enhanced security controls have been applied. Typically, this confirmation comprises a security certificate (manual or electronic) completed by the person who undertakes the screening of the bag (or by a person who witnessed the screening), and this certificate being attached to (or electronically incorporated within) the expedite baggage portion of the hold baggage manifest passed to the appointed person prior to departure. The certificate needs to record that the expedite bag passed security and the time this occurred. It is not a requirement to record which security means was used or the person doing the checking.

## **5.8 Baggage Identification and Authorization – Diplomatic Pouches**

- 5.8.1 Official sealed diplomatic pouches that are clearly and appropriately marked and identifiable as such and accompanied by signed documentation from an official of the dispatching diplomatic agency are not required to undergo screening but when carried in the hold will need to be included in the hold baggage manifest and authorised. Personal baggage of diplomatic couriers will be subject to normal processes in the same manner as for other travellers.

## **5.9 Baggage Identification and Authorization – Duty free parcels and security items**

- 5.9.1 Duty free parcels taken from passengers at the gate for carriage in the aircraft hold are to be treated as gate bags and included in the hold baggage manifest.
- 5.9.2 Security items taken from a passenger when his or her carry on cabin baggage is screened and which, with the agreement of the air operator, are placed and carried in the aircraft hold are to be treated as gate baggage and included on the hold baggage manifest.

## **5.10 Passenger and Crew Identification and Boarding**

- 5.10.1 An air operator must have a system in place which confirms that each person who is recorded as having placed hold baggage in the custody of the aircraft operator boards the flight.
- 5.10.2 A passenger identification document check (manual or electronic) must be undertaken at check-in and at the Boarding Gate to ensure that each person who checks in a bag is the same person who boards the aircraft, i.e. that no “passenger switch” occurs.
- 5.10.3 At check-in, the name on the passenger’s passport/identity card or other accepted government issued identification document should be checked and verified with the passenger details recorded for the flight and the photograph checked and verified with the passenger.
- 5.10.4 At the Boarding Gate, the name on the passenger’s boarding pass should be checked and verified with the name in the passport/identity card or other accepted government issued identification document, and the photograph checked and verified with the passenger. An additional check must be made to ensure that the boarding pass relates to the flight that the passenger is boarding.
- 5.10.5 Effective procedures must be implemented at the Gate to ensure that, should a passenger

not board this can be readily identified in order that any hold baggage associated with that passenger can be unloaded.

- 5.10.6 Subject to the exemptions contained in this Advisory Circular for rule 108.55(b)(13), where the owner of an item of hold baggage not loaded as expedite baggage fails to board the aircraft the item must be removed from the aircraft prior to departure of the flight.

## **5.11 Checking Hold Baggage Manifest by Appointed Person**

- 5.11.1 Prior to departure of the aircraft, the appointed person must be in possession of the hold baggage manifest and check and confirm that to the best of their knowledge:

- (1) each entry on the hold baggage manifest in respect of accompanied hold baggage shows the correct details relevant to the flight, i.e. date and flight number; and
- (2) each item of hold baggage (including transfer baggage) has been confirmed as having been authorized to be loaded, and there is written or electronic evidence of this; and
- (3) there is tangible evidence that each item of expedite baggage has been subjected to enhanced security controls, e.g. a security certificate is present with the bag details; and
- (4) the hold baggage manifest includes gate baggage and crew baggage; and
- (5) any baggage offloads have been carried out that are due to passengers or crew not boarding; and
- (6) the hold baggage manifest is a complete record of all bags loaded onto the aircraft.

- 5.11.2 When the appointed person has confirmed that the above requirements have been met, then prior to departure of the aircraft, the appointed person must either:

- (1) sign (or confirm by electronic means) the hold baggage manifest to confirm that the requirements have been met; or (b) raise a summary document (a Manifest Declaration Form) which shows the totals of hold baggage and expedite baggage loaded, together with a declaration that all checks have been undertaken and sign this one document. If a summary document is used, then all supporting documentation must be attached to the summary document. The aircraft operator must retain each hold baggage manifest (and supporting documentation) in an accessible format for not less than 48 hours. It should preferably be retained at the airport of departure or local office but must not under any circumstances be carried aboard the aircraft to which it pertains.

## **5.12 System Outage – Alternative contingency**

- 5.12.1 Alternative processes acceptable to the Director, may be included in hold baggage authorisation procedures for when the dedicated electronic system is out of action for any reason.

- 5.12.2 Where any electronic system outage has occurred, the following temporary alternative process may be applied to facilitate the minimisation of any departure delay—

- (a) The number of bags loaded and baggage stubs will be counted and the results compared; and
- (b) Where there is no discrepancy between the two counts the flight may depart; and
- (c) If the number of bags loaded exceeds the number of bags recorded as having been checked-in, all bags must be reconciled; and
- (d) The off-loading of baggage of any person failing to board must still occur.

5.12.3 Where baggage on any flight has been processed under these contingency arrangements, the CASA Aviation Security Branch is to be advised, with supporting information, on the reasons why and actions taken, within 24 hours.

**5.12.4 Quality Control processes**

5.12.5 An air operator must have an effective internal quality management control system and audit process in place to monitor the compliance with these hold baggage authorisation requirements. Such systems need to include both quality checks by local management and programmed checks by the operator's security coordinators.